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UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
UNDER SIEGE:
HOW THE WAR ON TERROR HAS
PLACED ACADEMIC FREEDOM
UNDER FIRE
JAMES TEMPLIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. District Court in Knoxville, Tennessee convicted a professor
from the University of Texas who had the potential sentence of up to 150
years in prison and $1.5M in fines for working with a Chinese research
student on a high-technology project.1 Prosecutors charged professor
emeritus Dr. Reece Roth, highly renowned for his work in plasma research, for conspiring to violate the Arms Export Control Act.2 Under
the Act, Professor Roth violated federal law by permitting his American
research assistant to share information with his Chinese research assistant.3 The professor and his research assistants were working as subcontractors for a Tennessee technology company that was developing
plasma technology for the U.S. Air Force.4 Interestingly, Dr. Roth had
secured a patent for the technology used for the research prior to enter* J.D., The John Marshall Law School 2009; B.A. Political Science, Alma College.
The author would like to dedicate this article to Lynda Marie Edds – in fond memory of her
love and support.
1. See Duncan Mansfield, Ex-Tenn. Professor Guilty of Passing Military Data, A.P.,
Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://origin2.foxnews.com/wires/2008Sep03/0,4670,ProfessorSecrets,00.html. Dr. Roth, age 72, was sentenced to 48 months in prison on July 1, 2009.
See Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Former University of Tennessee Professor
John Reece Roth Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Illegally Exporting Military Research Technical Data (Jul. 1, 2009), available at http://knoxville.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/kx070109.html.
2. See Jamie Satterfield, Retired UT Prof Guilty; Case Gained National Attention,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/
2008/sep/03/ex-ut-prof-guilty/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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ing into the research contract with the company.5 Initially assigned to
work separately, Dr. Roth gave permission to the two students to share
information because of the complexity and difficulty of the project.6
In wake of a 2007 report from the Deemed Export Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”), Dr. Roth’s conviction highlights critical
problems within the current deemed export control policy of the United
States.7 The report is highly critical of current export regulations,
suggesting:
Viewed in the context of the evolving security and commercial environments of the post-Cold War 21st Century, the long established regulations that control deemed exports appear today to possess a number of
shortcomings that range from the way the regulations are written and
interpreted by the Government to the change in the very business and
research environment to which the regulations are applied. The most
prevalent of these shortcomings is that the current deemed export regulations have become increasingly irrelevant in the prevailing globalized
commercial, academic and national security environments.8

In fact, the Bureau of Industry and Science’s (“BIS”) interpretation and
enforcement of the deemed export rule has been damaging to United
States industry, research, and ability to compete in the globalized
world.9
The tragedy of September 11, 2001, the subsequent anthrax attacks,
and ongoing international terror threats have markedly changed national and international security. As concerns about threats and terror5. See Darren Dunlap, Roth Says He Will Retire at End of Semester, KNOXVILLE NEWS
SENTINEL, Apr. 16, 2008, available at http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/apr/16/rothsays-he-will-retire-at-end-of-semester/. Professor Roth had extensive ties with AGT, the
Tennessee technology company in question, and in 1994, he originated the general technology of electrohydrodynamic plasma actuators. See Tom Chester, Feds Investigating Retired
UT Professor: Office Searched, Laptop Seized – Researcher May Have Violated Arms Export
Control Act, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, July 1, 2006, available at http://www.knoxnews.
com/news/2006/jul/01/feds-investigating-retired-ut-professor/. Professor Roth has several
patents on technology that AGT has used in his research. Id.
6. See Duncan Mansfield, Ex-Tenn. Professor Guilty of Passing Military Data, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, September 3, 2008, available at http://www.wtopnews.com/
?nid=104&sid=1407503.
7. See DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMM., THE DEEMED EXPORT RULE IN THE ERA OF
GLOBALIZATION (2007), available at http://tac.bis.doc.gov/2007/deacreport.pdf [hereinafter
ERA OF GLOBALIZATION].
8. Id. at 9.
9. See, e.g., ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7; see generally Benjamin Findley, Revisions to the United States Deemed-Export Regulations: Implications for Universities, University Research, and Foreign Faculty, Staff, and Students 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1223 (2006)
(reviewing the history of United States export controls and arguing that the proposed revisions to U.S. export regulations in March 2005 and May 2006 are contrary to established
export policy and would adversely impact university fundamental research as well as national security).
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ist activities have become global, so have the rapid transfer of
information and communication. The confluence of the globalization of
business and the revolution in information storage and transmittal has
changed the landscape upon which to build national and international
security. This requires a re-examination of the security measures developed during the days of the Cold War to assess whether those tools are
still appropriate and to determine how they are affecting current science
and technology enterprises.10 The prevailing globalized commercial, academic, and national security environments have left the United States
government “tilting at windmills.”11 The government can no longer afford to implement a Cold War-era deemed export regulatory regime.
This Comment analyzes the proposed revisions to United States export regulations contained in the Deemed Export Advisory Committee’s
2007 report.12 While the Advisory Committee’s work was much needed
and its recommendations laudable, this comment discusses why its recommendations must be narrowly tailored in order to preserve the competitiveness of U.S. businesses and universities in the globalizing world
and to advance national security. Part II explains the regulations that
govern U.S. exports, including the deemed export regulatory regime and
how those rules implement a range of national obligations and interests.
This Part also discusses the events that threatened to significantly burden the research process and establish strong disincentives to employ
foreign students in critical university research, which led to the establishment of the Deemed Export Advisory Committee. Part III examines
10. COMM. ON A NEW GOV’T-UNIV. P’SHIP FOR SCI. AND SEC. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNSCI. AND SEC. IN A POST 9/11 WORLD: A REPORT BASED ON REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS BESCI. AND SEC. CMTY. (2007), available at http://www.nap.edu/
TWEEN
THE
catalog.php?record_id=12013 [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL]
11. MIGUEL DE CERVANTES SAAVEDRA, DON QUIJOTE DE LA MANCHA 98 (Burton Raffel
trans., W. W. Norton & Co. 1996) (1605). This idiomatic phrase originated in the novel Don
Quijote, and is used today in reference to persistent engagement in a futile activity. At one
point in the novel, Don Quijote fights windmills that he imagines to be giants.
He sees the windmill blades as the giant’s arms:
Just then they came in sight of thirty or forty windmills that rise from that plain.
And no sooner did Don Quixote see them that he said to his squire, “Fortune is
guiding our affairs better than we ourselves could have wished. Do you see over
yonder, friend Sancho, thirty or forty hulking giants? I intend to do battle with
them and slay them. With their spoils we shall begin to be rich for this is a righteous war and the removal of so foul a brood from off the face of the earth is a
service God will bless.”
“What giants?” asked Sancho Panza.
“Those you see over there,” replied his master, “with their long arms. Some of
them have arms well nigh two leagues in length.”
“Take care, sir,” cried Sancho. “Those over there are not giants but windmills.
Those things that seem to be their arms are sails which, when they are whirled
around by the wind, turn the millstone.” Id. at Pt. 1, Ch. VIII.
12. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7.
CIL,
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the evolution and policies underlying the systems of export regulations
in the United States.
Part IV discusses the findings, recommendations, and implementing
actions of the Advisory Committee in specific detail, including its primary finding that the current deemed export rule does not reflect the
realities of today’s national security needs or global economy. Part V
analyzes the implications of these revisions by examining the costs of
compliance for U.S. universities and businesses and by discussing its impact on foreign researchers. Further, this section analyzes how narrowing the list of controlled technologies facilitates the scientific research
and innovation necessary to advance U.S. national security. Lastly, Part
V analyzes the impact that sensitive but unclassified clauses in government research contracts have on foreign nationals in university research,
in light of the government’s stated policies regarding export controls.
Part VI recommends using the Visa Mantis screening process as the
primary method of providing information to the federal government on
national security threats posed by individuals seeking to enter the U.S.,
rather than relying on universities.13 This Part further recommends
narrowing the list of controlled technologies to items not readily available to the international science and technology community beyond the
scope of U.S. controls that should be intensively protected from dissemination because of substantive and significant application to national security. Lastly, this Part recommends reaffirming the stated policy of
academic freedom established in NSDD-189.14
Finally, Part VIII concludes that in light of the globalized, competitive environment, government policies restricting the utilization of foreign national talent impose significant prohibitive barriers on university
research, innovation, and collaboration. These barriers present a serious
risk of adversely impacting U.S. national security. Thus, regulations
should be narrowly-crafted to clearly and effectively address specific policy objectives without excessively and inappropriately burdening research and industry.
II. BACKGROUND
At a basic level, export controls are legal prohibitions against exporting
certain materials, software, or technology without a license.15 Violators
13. The Visa Mantis screening process is addressed in greater specificity in Part VI.
14. The NSDD-189 is a national security directive establishing a national policy for
controlling the flow of science, technology, and engineering information produced in federally-funded fundamental research at colleges, universities, and laboratories.
15. See MARK A. BOHNHORST, EXPORT CONTROLS IN UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: BASICS AND
PROBLEM AREAS (Univ. of Minn. ed., 2005).

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-4\SFT405.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 5

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH UNDER SEIGE

20-APR-10

7:20

551

can face lengthy prison sentences and stiff fines.16 Export controls implement a range of national obligations and interests, such as honoring
treaties (e.g., nuclear non-proliferation, conventions on chemical and biological weapons),17 protecting national security, and combating
terrorism.
A. THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS GOVERN U.S. EXPORTS
Espionage laws, patent controls, and other related legislation regulate
purely commercial items and knowledge exported by the United States.
The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) governs the exportation of purely military items and knowledge.18 Items or knowledge
having a dual-use (i.e., applicability in both the military and commercial
spheres) are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”)
and fall into two sub-categories.19 The first category concerns the transfer or release of items across a U.S. border while the second addresses
16. Id.
17. See U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Wassenaar Arrangement, available at http://www.
bis.doc.gov/Wassenaar/default.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, is
one of four multilateral export control regimes in which the United States participates.
The Arrangement’s purpose is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use (i.e. those having civil and military uses) goods and technologies to prevent destabilizing accumulations of those items. The Wassenaar Arrangement establishes
lists of items for which member countries are to apply export controls. Member governments implement these controls to ensure that transfers of the controlled items do not
contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine the
goals of the Arrangement, and do not divert to support such capabilities. Id.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group is a group of 40 member countries established in 1992
and focused on stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. See The Nuclear Suppliers
Group, available at http://www.nsg-online.org/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) prompted the formation of the
Australia Group (“AG”) in 1985. Australia, concerned with Iraq’s development of chemical
weapons, recommended harmonization of international export controls on chemical weapons precursor chemicals. As the AG membership grew, it expanded its focus to include
chemical production equipment and technologies and measures to prevent the proliferation
of biological weapons. Today the AG is composed of 34 member countries. See Australia
Group, http://www.australiagroup.net/en/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
The United States has been a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (“Regime”) since the regime’s inception in 1987. The focus of the Regime is to limit the proliferation of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Initially, the Regime
consisted of only seven members. By the end of Fiscal Year 2002, the Regime has grown to
include 33 member countries that have agreed to coordinate their national export controls
to stem missile proliferation. See Missile Technology Control Regime, http:// http://www.
mtcr.info/english/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2008).
18. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.2 (2006).
19. See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2009).
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the transfer of technology or source code (also referred to as “knowledge”).20 This comment does not address purely commercial items and
knowledge, but instead focuses on the rules found in the EAR and
ITAR.21
1. The EAR in Brief
The EAR is a set of rules governing the exportation of dual-use technologies.22 Under the EAR, dual-use exports involve technology “that has[s]
both commercial and military or proliferation applications.”23 To constitute an export under the EAR, “an actual shipment or transmission of
items [including technology or software subject to the EAR] out of the
United States,” must occur.24 In addition, the deemed export regulatory
regime controls technology or source code subject to the EAR that is
transferred (or released) to a foreign national within the confines of the
United States.25 Such “releases” are “deemed to be an export to the
home country. . .of the foreign national.”26
The EAR contains a list of items called the Commerce Control List
(“CCL”) for which licenses are required for exports or re-exports27 to cer20. These categories are discussed and cited in great detail in the following section.
21. See generally Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, A Frequently
Asked Questions Guide to Export Licensing Requirements for Commercial Items, http://
www.bis.doc.gov/exportlicensingqanda.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (providing a comprehensive guide to compliance with United States export regulations, including submissions
of export license applications).
22. See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2009).
23. Id. at § 772.1; see also at § 730.3.
24. Id. at § 772.1. The term “subject to the EAR” is a defined term of art in the EAR
used “to describe those commodities, software, technology, and activities over which the
U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security exercises regulatory jurisdiction under the EAR.” Id.
25. See Id. at § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
26. An export of technology or software includes,
[a]ny release of technology or source code subject to the EAR to a foreign national.
The EAR deems such release as an export to the home country or countries of the
foreign national. This deemed export rule does not apply to persons lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States and does not apply to persons
who are protected individuals under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See
8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3) (2009).
Note that the release of any item to any party with knowledge a violation is about to occur
is prohibited by 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(10) of the EAR.
27. “Re-export” means an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR
from one foreign country to another foreign country. For purposes of the EAR, the export
or re-export of items subject to the EAR that will transit through a country or countries, or
be transshipped in a country or countries to a new country, or are intended for re-export to
the new country, are deemed to be exports to the new country. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)
(2009). In addition, for purposes of satellites controlled by the Department of Commerce,
the term “re-export” also includes the transfer of registration of a satellite or operational
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tain countries.28 The list is divided into ten categories, Categories 0-9,
covering items such as materials processing, computers, telecommunications, information security, and navigation and avionics. Depending on
an item’s classification within these categories, a license may be required
for export to one country, but not another.29 In addition to these listbased controls, the EAR identifies other circumstances in which licensing may be required for transactions that would otherwise require no
license or would be eligible for a licensing exception.30 Exports and reexports for which a license may be required (or prohibited altogether)
include transactions involving a sanctioned country, a prohibited party,
or use in connection with the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons or related missile systems.31 In addition, persons are
prohibited from exporting, re-exporting, or participating in any manner
in an export or re-export of an item subject to the EAR with knowledge
that a violation of the EAR has occurred, is about to occur, or is intended
to occur.32
2. The ITAR in Brief
Like the EAR, the ITAR is a set of regulations that governs exports,
albeit those of military33 and space-related34 goods and technologies. In
addition to governing exports of a different nature than the EAR,35 the
definition of export in the ITAR varies from the EAR.36 Under the ITAR,
“sending or taking a defense article out of the United States in any manner” constitutes exporting.37 In addition, “disclosing (including oral or
control over a satellite from a party resident in one country to a party resident in another
country. Id. at § 772.
28. Id. at § 736.2(b)(1)-(3).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at § 736.2(b)(4)-(9).
32. Id. at § 736.2(b)(10).
33. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.2 (2006).
34. Id. § 121.1; see Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR): Control of Commercial Communications Satellites on the United States Munitions
List, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,679, 13,680 (Mar. 22, 1999).
35. Compare 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2009) (providing that the EAR governs the export of
items with both military and civilian uses), and 15 C.F.R. § 738.1(a) (2009), with 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.1 (2009) (providing that the Department of State has the power to control the export
and import of defense articles and services), and 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2009) (providing that
articles and services controlled by the ITAR must be specifically military), and 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.4 (2009).
36. Compare 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2009) (“[e]xport means actual shipment or transmission of items out of the United States”), with 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1) (2009) (“[e]xport
means . . . taking a defense article out of the United States in any manner. . . .”).
37. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1). “[M]ere travel . . . by a person whose personal knowledge
includes technical data” does not constitute an export. Id.
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visual disclosure) or transferring technical data to a foreign person,
whether in the United States or abroad,” qualifies as an export.38
Items and technology controlled by the ITAR are contained in
United States Munitions List,39 which the Office of Defense Trade Controls, a subdivision within the Department of State, maintains.40 The
ITAR requires an export license to export an item or technology subject
to the list.41 Note that unlike the EAR, the end destination for the export does not affect the licensing requirement.42 All exports of U.S.
Munitions List goods (referred to as defense articles) and technology require licenses.43
B. THE DEEMED EXPORT RULE
The EAR and ITAR both apply to exports of tangible and intangible
items such as technical knowledge or data.44 As mentioned above, an
export of intangible knowledge or data is a deemed export, presumably
because upon returning home the foreign national retains the information.45 The term “deemed export” comes from the EAR, which states
that “ ‘[e]xport’ of technology or software . . . includes: (ii) Any release of
technology or source code subject to the EAR to a foreign national. Such
release is deemed to be an export to the home country or countries of the
foreign national.”46 Deemed exports may occur quite frequently in academic research settings where foreign nationals are able to observe controlled equipment in use or discuss controlled equipment or technical
data.47 As defined, to be a deemed export, the EAR or ITAR must cover
the technical information in question.48 The EAR defines “technology”
as “specific information necessary for the ‘development,’ ‘production,’ or
‘use’ of a product.”49 The EAR limits technology items to items on the
Commerce Control List for which there are provisions that control each
38. Id. at § 120.17(a)(4).
39. See Amendments to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR): Control
of Commercial Communications Satellites on the United States Munitions List, 64 Fed.
Reg. 13,679, 13,680 (Mar. 22, 1999).
40. Id. at §§ 120.1-.2, 121.1; see Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of
State, U.S. System of Enforcement of Export Controls (2001), available at http://www.state.
gov/t/pm/.
41. See 22 C.F.R. § 123.1(a) (2009).
42. Id.
43. Id. at § 120.2.
44. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b) (2006); 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2009).
45. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2009).
46. Id. at § 734.2(b)(2).
47. Id. at § 734.2(b)(3)(i)-(ii).
48. Id. at § 734.2(b); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1), 120.17(a)(3)-(4).
49. 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (2009).
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category on the list.50 Note that the words “production,” “development,”
and “use” are all defined terms in the EAR.51 Similarly, the ITAR covers
“technical data,”52 which is akin to the EAR’s definition of “technology”.53 Without exclusions to the EAR and ITAR, many foreign students
cannot participate in university research without export licenses.54
C. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH AND
EDUCATIONAL-INFORMATION EXCLUSIONS
The EAR and ITAR both contain exclusions that allow universities and
researchers to utilize foreign nationals in their research. The most important of these exclusions to universities are the fundamental research
exclusion and educational-information exclusion. The fundamental-research exclusion is created by 15 C.F.R. § 734.8(a) and 22 C.F.R.
§ 120.11(a)(8). In its report, the Department of Commerce Inspector General refers to this exclusion as the fundamental-research exception, but
as noted in the May 2006 Withdrawal, exports either are subject to the
EAR or they are not.55 Thus, the term “exclusion” is actually more appropriate for describing material covered by fundamental research, not
by the scope of the EAR. This same logic applies for the educationalinformation exclusion.56 Although the exclusions are slightly different
under the EAR and ITAR,57 both require that the information be publicly available. Both the EAR and ITAR recognize that if the results of
the research enter the public domain from publication, they are inappro50. Id.
51. Id. “Production” includes all stages, including: product engineering, manufacture,
integration, assembly (mounting), inspection, testing, and quality assurance. “Development” is related to all stages prior to serial production, such as: design, design research,
design analyses, design concepts, assembly and testing of prototypes, pilot production
schemes, design data, process of transforming design data into a product, configuration
design, integration design, layouts. While “use” is defined: operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul and refurbishing. Id.
52. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a), § 120.17(a)(4) (2006).
53. Compare id. at § 120.10(a)(1) (stating that “[i]nformation . . . which is required for
the design, development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing,
maintenance or modification of defense articles”), with 15 C.F.R. § 772.1 (stating that
“[s]pecific information necessary for the ‘development,’ ‘production,’ or ‘use’ of a product.”).
54. See, e.g., Letter from Katharina Phillips, President, Council on Governmental Relations, to Alexander Lopes, Dir., Deemed Expt. and Elec. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 4
(June 24, 2005), available at http://www.cogr.edu/docs/ExportControlCommentLetter.doc.
55. See Revisions and Clarification of Deemed Export Related Regulatory Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 30,840, 30,841 (May 31, 2006), available at http://
researchadmin.uchicago.edu/regulations/DOC-DeemedExport.pdf.
56. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.9 (2008); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(5) (2006).
57. For the differences between the definitions of fundamental-research exclusions,
compare 15 C.F.R. § 734.8 (2008) with 22 C.F.R. §120.11(a)(8) (2006). For the educationalinformation exclusion, compare 15 C.F.R. § 734.9 (2008) with 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5).
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priate for export control.58
Generally, the fundamental research exclusion applies for basic and
applied research ordinarily published within the scientific community, so
long as researchers openly conduct the research and without restrictions
on publication or access to or dissemination of the research results.59
The educational-information exclusion, or “teaching exemption,” authorizes the disclosure of educational information released by instruction in
catalog courses or general scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles commonly taught in colleges and universities without a license.60
The fundamental research exclusions in both the EAR and ITAR derive from the Reagan Administration’s national policy stance towards research.61 In 1985, the National Security Decision Directive (“NSDD189”) established a national policy for controlling the flow of science,
technology, and engineering information produced in federally funded
research universities.62 The policy provides that classification should be
the only means of restricting access to research with national security
implications unless otherwise provided for by statute.63 Further, all unclassified fundamental research should be without restrictions.64
NSDD-189 uses the findings of the 1982 Corson Report – a National
Academy of Sciences study regarding the need for controls on scientific
information.65 The Department of Defense and National Science Foundation commissioned the Corson Report in order to respond to growing
concerns that significant technology was being obtained by the Soviet
Union and that universities may play a large part in that transfer. Contrary to those concerns, the commission found that universities played a
minimal role in the Soviet’s acquisition of technology and further, that
the national security of the United States required openness in university research in order to nurture exemplary scientific development.66
Despite an end to the Cold War, new concerns arose concerning the
transfer of sensitive technology to foreign nations thereby jeopardizing
58. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.8(a) (2008); 22 C.F.R. § 120.11(a)(8) (2006).
59. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.8(a)(5) (2008); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(5) (2006), 22 C.F.R.
§§ 120.11(a)(8)(i).
60. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.9 (2008); 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(5) (2006).
61. See National Security Directives of the Reagan Administration, available at http://
www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm.
62. Id; see Nat’l Sec. Decision Directive 189 (Sept. 21, 1985), in NATIONAL SECURITY
DIRECTIVES OF THE REAGAN AND BUSH ADMINISTRATIONS: THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY OF THE
U.S. POLITICAL AND MILITARY POLICY, 1981-1991, at 595 (Christopher Simpson ed., 1995).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Panel on Scientific Commc’n & Nat’l Sec., Nat’l Acad. of Sciences, Scientific
Communication and National Security 40-41 (1982); see NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 10.
66. Id.
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the national security of the United States.67 Pursuant to the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, the Departments of
Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State were required to review export
law and report to Congress regarding the export of technology and information to countries of concern.68 In March 2004, the Department of
Commerce Inspector General published a report entitled, “Bureau of Industry and Security: Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nations in the United States”
(“Commerce Report”).69 This report reflects the reviews performed by
each agency, and lists several deficiencies in the deemed export
process.70
1. Exclusions Come Under Fire From 2004 Department of Commerce
Report
The Commerce Report found the requirements for a deemed export
license – mainly the access to “development,” “production,” and “use”
67. In 2002 and 2003 the Bush administration issued a series of related security strategies designed to counter terrorists and other criminal actors, state sponsors of terrorism,
weak states, rogue regional actors, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The capstone document is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
issued in September 2002. See White House, The Nat’l Sec. Strategy of the U.S. (2002),
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf.
Its pervasive theme is the United States vulnerability to attack from new sources and by
different means than in the past: “America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic
technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” Id. Although the 2002 Security Strategy
paints a broad picture of U.S. strategic concerns, it concentrates on a key threat to the
United States: sensitive technology in the hands of rogue states:
The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The
United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses
against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with
other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies’ efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. Id.
68. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65,
§ 922, 113 Stat. 512, 724 (1999).
69. See Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Final Inspection Report No. IPE-16176, Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S. (2004), available at http://www.
oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2004/BIS-IPE-16176-03-2004.pdf [hereinafter Final Inspection
Report].
70. For instance, the Commerce Report questioned the EAR’s longstanding policy that
based an applicant’s nationality on most recent citizenship or permanent residency. This
policy was unlike the ITAR, which took into account an individual’s citizenship and residency from cradle to grave. Among other recommendations, the Commerce Report proposed that the deemed export licensing policy be based on a national’s country of birth. Id.
at 17. The Report also pointed out that deemed export licensing requirements employ too
broad an interpretation of the term “use.” Id.
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technical information – as too broadly defined regarding “use.”71 Under
the EAR, the term “use” is composed of six criteria in combination (i.e.,
all six must occur for an item to be categorized as “use” technology, and
consequently potentially requiring a deemed export license). In particular, it suggested that any of the six criteria occurring individually should
render an item’s “use” technology subject to potential deemed export-licensing requirements.72 The report also criticized the current deemed
export-licensing policy for focusing only on the subject’s nation of current
citizenship instead of all of the nationalities that the foreign national
subject has ever maintained.73 The report recommended that BIS
change its policy to require United States entities to “apply for a deemed
export license for employees or visitors who are foreign nationals and
have access to dual-use controlled technology if they were born in a country where the technology transfer in question is EAR controlled regardless of their most recent citizenship or permanent resident status.”74
71. “Some of BIS’ senior licensing officials maintain that for consistency purposes in
the EAR, the word ‘and’ in the definition infers that all of the activities have to be accomplished to constitute ‘use.’ We disagree.” Id. at 14.
72. According to the Commerce Report, “the definition could be interpreted as simply a
listing of the various activities associated with the term “use” which does not require that
each activity be accomplished to constitute use.” Id. Moreover, although BIS normally
grants approval for a foreign end user to operate, install, maintain, repair, overhaul, and
refurbish a piece of controlled equipment exported from the United States in order to permit the full range of uses for an export, the same definition of use does not seem to apply to
deemed exports (i.e., foreign nationals “using” the equipment in the United States.). It is
unlikely that one individual who has access to the technology for the use of a controlled
piece of equipment—as is the case with a deemed export—would have the “knowhow” and
be assigned the responsibility for undertaking all six of these tasks. Final Inspection Report, supra n ote 69.
73. Specifically, the Commerce Report states that current deemed export policy permits foreign nationals who originate from countries of concern and have access to controlled dual-use technology to bypass the extensive screening process required of a deemed
license application. Id. Moreover, if that same foreign national came directly to the United
States from Iran on an H1-B visa with the intent of working on controlled dual-use technology, the U.S. employer would be required to apply for a BIS deemed export license for that
particular foreign national. The Report states, “BIS’ policy contrasts with that of the State
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, which requires export license applications involving munitions to include all current nationalities for all foreign national employees expected to receive defense services and technical data.” Id. at 16. As such, the
State Department prescribes that a person born in Syria, who later becomes a citizen or
permanent resident of Canada while retaining his Syrian citizenship, should be regarded
as both Syrian and Canadian. Id..
74. In a 1998 memorandum to the then-Assistant Secretary for Export Administration,
the State Department recommended that BIS amend the dual-use export regulations to
follow its policy of noting dual citizenship. Specifically, the State Department recommended that “place of birth be taken into consideration when reviewing applications” because “nationals from state sponsors of terrorism may travel on European passports or
have multiple nationalities.” Id. at 17. While BIS never responded to the State Department’s memo, its policy remained unchanged. Id.
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In response to the Commerce Report, BIS published a Federal Register Notice in March 2005 to provide advance public notice and to solicit
public comments on proposed EAR rule changes that satisfied the alleged deficiencies noted in the report (“March 2005 Announcement”).75
Included in the March 2005 Announcement were proposed revisions to
change “and” to “or” in the “use” definition, and potential consideration
of additional citizenship information in the review of deemed export license applications.76 Many of the arguments and assertions contained
in the public comments received in response to this notice were that the
“or” interpretation would capture too many routine operations carried
out by foreign national students and employees, and that the proposed
rules would constitute a large (and, it was asserted, generally unnecessary) compliance burden on affected organizations.77
Similarly, the Department of Defense began to revise its own regulations after receiving a report examining the impact of export controls on
contractors, universities, and federally funded research facilities.78 The
report noted that all six of the universities it examined were aware of the
EAR and the ITAR, and that most universities it examined qualified for
exemptions from the regulations. The report, however, found that most
universities rely exclusively on the language of their research contracts
with the government in order to identify whether they qualified for the
fundamental-research exclusion.79 In response to the report, the Department of Defense promulgated a new proposed contract clause for the
75. The March 2005 Announcement states that BIS is “reviewing the recommendations contained in the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Inspector General Report
entitled ‘Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to
Foreign Nationals in the U.S.’ ” Revision and Clarification of Deemed Export Related Regulatory Requirements, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,607, 15,608 (Mar. 28, 2005), available at http://www.
fas.org/sgp/news/2005/03/fr032805.html. If adopted by BIS, certain of these recommendations would “require regulatory changes that would affect existing requirements and policies for deemed export licenses.” Id. Thus, BIS announced that it is seeking comments on
how these revisions would affect industry, the academic community, and U.S. government
agencies involved in research. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Office of the Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Report No. D-2004-061, Export
Controls: Export-Controlled Technology at Contractor, University, and Federally Funded
Research and Development Center Facilities (2004), available at http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy04/04-061.pdf.
79. The reliance on this contract language presented problems because not all federal
research contracts specified that they contained export-sensitive technology subject to the
EAR and the ITAR—and even when they did, the language varied depending on the granting authority. Id. at 12. Furthermore, the Department of Defense found one contract involving export-controlled technology in which a foreign graduate student was given
unauthorized access to the technology. Id. at 16. This led the Department to conclude that
universities posed a large risk for the transfer of technology to foreign nationals. Id.
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Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement80 in July 2005.81
2. Adverse Effects of Commerce’s Recommendations if Adopted
The proposed regulations in the Commerce Report are troubling because universities would have to secure a large number of licenses for its
foreign-national students.82 This is particularly troublesome to universities that rely on foreign-born research students or universities that
typically attract international students.83 As of 2007, the United States
80. 48 C.F.R.§ 2.000 (2005). The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(“DFARS”) is a subset of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, which provide guidance for
when restrictions and terms are required in federal contracts. See id. § 1.101. Each agency
has its own supplemental Federal Acquisition Regulations, for which the Department of
Defense is the DFARS. Id. at 2.000. Each FAR and FAR supplement has a subchapter
that contains all of the contract clauses. See, e.g., id. at subpt. 52.1. Often, FAR clauses
are passed down from primary contractors to all subcontractors, and some FAR clauses
actually require such treatment. See Letter from Nils Hasselmo, President, Am. Ass’n of
Univs., to Def. Acquisitions Regulation Council 3, 5 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://
www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=1&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.aau.edu
%2FWorkArea%2FDownloadAsset.aspx%3Fid%3D3040&ei=gNVpStiOGIO0NryivacL&
usg=AFQjCNFG3C8RD5akoxW6dmdVbCTJMI9d6Q.
81. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Export-Controlled Information and Technology, 70 Fed. Reg. 39,976, 39,976-77 (Dep’t of Def. July 12, 2005). The
Department intended for the new clause to clarify the obligation of contract recipients to
comply with U.S. export regulations. Id. at 39,977. The proposed regulation would have
required defense contracting officers to include a clause in all Department of Defense research contracts identifying any export-controlled technology or information. Id. The
clause would require universities to “maintain an effective export compliance program,”
with a control plan that “shall include unique badging requirements for foreign nationals. . .and segregated work areas for export-controlled information and technology.” Id.
Furthermore, the contractor would be required to comply with the EAR and the ITAR and
not allow foreign nationals access to export-controlled technology without licenses or authorization. Id.
Fortunately, following the BIS decision to withdraw its March 2005 Announcement,
the Department of Defense also withdrew this proposed DFARS clause and promulgated
two new clauses. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Export-Controlled Information and Technology (DFARS Case 2004-D010), 71 Fed. Reg. 46,434, 46,435
(Dep’t of Def. Aug. 14, 2006). This comment discusses the DFARS clause to the extent
necessary to demonstrate how changes to the EAR and ITAR tend to affect other sets of
regulations. Currently, DFARS clauses do not contain the segregated work-space and foreign-national badging requirements; rather, contractors are required to comply with the
EAR and ITAR and instructed to contact the appropriate agencies for guidance. Id.
82. See Rachel Yates, Proposed Changes to US “Deemed Export” Law Threaten International Collaboration - Part II, INT’L SPACE REV., Oct. 2005, at 5, available at http://www.
hollandhart.com/articles/ProposedChangestoUSLaw2.pdf?CFID=2945344&CFTOKEN=36
784225 (stating that MIT estimates as many as 100,000 applications might be filed and
that many universities and businesses will apply for licenses for all of their foreign
researchers).
83. According to a report from the Engineering Workforce Commission of the American
Association of Engineering Societies, United States citizens outnumber foreign nationals in
undergraduate electrical engineering programs in United States universities by a wide
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attracted 22% of the world’s students studying outside their home country amounting to nearly 600,000 foreign students studying in the United
States.84 In 2005, applications to U.S. graduate schools from India increased 23% and from China 21%.85 Overall, international graduate applications increased by 11% between 2005 and 2006.86 Significantly, the
net contribution to the U.S. economy by foreign students is almost 13.5
billion dollars, not including foreign students’ immense contributions to
research, development, and scientific advancement.87 Since India and
China are both countries of concern to the Department of Commerce, research students from these countries would likely need deemed-export
licenses under the proposed regulations.88
Universities would also have to incur great costs to comply with the
proposed regulations in order to inventory all of its research equipment
listed on the CCL.89 In addition, each foreign student would have to obmargin; United States students accounted for 89 percent of the undergrads in these programs in 2006. However, 51% of the students in masters programs in electrical engineering programs in United States universities were foreign nationals in 2006, while only 49%
came from the United States. In PhD programs, foreign nationals made up 71% of the
students in 2006. See ENG’G WORKFORCE COMM’N OF THE AM. ASS’N OF ENG’G SOCIETIES,
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY ENROLLMENTS – 2006 (2006) (on file with Illinois Institute
of Technology), available at http://www.ewc-online.org/publications/enrollments.asp.
84. See Marguerite J. Dennis, Trends in International Higher Education (Video online
Seminar Series No. 1, 2007), available at http://handouts.aacrao.org/am07/finished/
T0130p_M_Dennis.pdf.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id.
87. See Antony Davies, Understanding the Value of Education: The Economics of College Tuition, Address at the U.S. House of Representatives Legislative Staff Seminar (Mar.
1, 2004) (transcript available in the George Mason University Library).
88. Even prior to the proposed BIS regulations, the flow of foreign students to the
United States slowed due to the more stringent visa-application process. Since the proposed regulations in the March 2005 Announcement would create further road-blocks for
foreign researchers in fundamental research, the numbers would likely decline further.
See Scott Shane, Universities Say New Rules Could Hurt U.S. Research, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
26, 2005, at A11. Meanwhile, world-class research institutions continue to emerge abroad.
See, e.g., Howard W. French, China Luring Foreign Scholars to Make Its Universities Great,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2005, at A1 (discussing Chinese universities attracting faculty from
Princeton); Cristi Hegranes, Student of Concern, S.F. WKLY., May 18, 2005 available at
http://www.sfweekly.com/2005-05-18/news/student-of-concern/ (noting that internationalstudent applications are already down 30 percent from 2003, while applications are increasing at universities in India, China, and the United Kingdom).
89. The Council on Governmental Relations (“COGR”) asked a number of universities
to estimate the burden of assessing the need for deemed export licenses for foreign nationals working in specific laboratories on their campuses under the proposed regulations. The
universities reported that the administrative burdens and costs are based on both assembling the inventory of potentially sensitive equipment and on the determination of whether
and how each item of equipment to be used in research would be controlled for use technology. The COGR found that a typical research university has thousands of pieces of research equipment in its inventory, and hundreds if not thousands of new pieces are
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tain deemed-export licenses for working with such equipment in the
course of research. Generally, deemed-export license applications take
between 60 and 90 days to process, which significantly burdens and delays the start of research.90 Once research commences, the university
would also be required to monitor the foreign student’s participation in
the project and restrict access to controlled equipment and information,
taking into consideration the student’s license.91 As the research progresses and new technology or information is necessary for the project,
the student would have to apply for additional licenses causing further
burdens and delays. Altogether, these restrictions significantly burden
the research process and establish strong disincentives to employ foreign
students in critical university research.92
acquired each year. For example, one university reported that it has more than 50,000
pieces of equipment with an acquisition cost of more than $5,000 each. This does not include the substantial number of items of equipment below $5000 that are not maintained
in the capital equipment inventory, but also may be controlled. Another university reported more than 70,000 pieces of equipment and one university system reported almost
140,000 pieces of equipment spread over many campuses. Each item of equipment would
need to be evaluated for controls in relation to each foreign student and researcher on
campus because, unless the open research environment is profoundly altered, any member
of the campus community could encounter and receive use technology relating to any piece
of equipment.
Several universities calculated that it would cost as much as $5 million initially for
each of them to classify all of the research equipment and apply for deemed export licenses
for their researchers and millions of additional dollars in ongoing annual compliance costs.
Universities with substantial amounts of equipment have estimated that between 40,000
and 60,000 person hours are necessary to complete the analysis and apply for licenses.
Such a commitment of manpower and resources is troubling because universities would be
forced to make a considerable reallocation of existing research dollars. See Letter from
Katharina Phillips, President, Council on Governmental Relations, to Alexander Lopes,
Dir., Deemed Exports and Elecs. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (June 24, 2005), available at
http://www.cogr.edu/files/ExportControls.cfm.
90. Ilona Shtrom, Senior Export Policy Analyst, U.S Dep’t of Commerce, Bureau of
Indus. & Sec., Deemed Exports and Electronics Div., Address at the Federal Laboratory
Consortium for Technology Transfer – Northeast Regional Meeting: How U.S. Export Controls Effect Tech Transfer (Mar. 20, 2007), available at http://www.flcnortheast.org/Albany2007/US_Export_Controls-Ilona_Shtrom.pdf.
91. See Laurie Au, Restrictions May Fracture Research, DIAMONDBACK (College Park,
Md.), Dec. 15, 2005, available at http://www.diamondbackonline.com/news/2005/12/15/
NewsonCampus/Restrictions.May.Fracture.Research-2323828.shtml (discussing Jianyang
Li’s relegation to less desirable portions of the research due to export restrictions based on
his Chinese nationality).
92. See, e.g., Edward Gerjuoy, Controls on Scientific Information, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 447, 458-59 (1985) (discussing the reaction of the President of the University of Minnesota to the Department of State’s request that a foreign student be prohibited from accessing government-funded, unpublished work); Letter from Nils Hasselmo, President, Ass’n
of Am. Universities, to Regulatory Policy Div., Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce at 11 (June 27, 2005), available at http://www.aau.edu/research/
AAU_Comments_on_Export_Controls-06-27-05.pdf (discussing one university faculty
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The Commerce Report also diminishes the educational-information
exclusion by narrowing the definition of “use.” Although the report initially reiterated the traditional exclusion from licensing of “educational
information released as instruction in catalog courses and associated
teaching laboratories,” it came to the conclusion that technology relating
to controlled equipment is subject to the deemed export provisions.93
Such use of equipment is subject to controls even if the research conducted with that equipment is fundamental.94 Thus, if the ITAR (EAR)
deems the use of equipment in fundamental research as an export, then
classroom use or instruction on how to use such equipment must likewise be a deemed export.95 By narrowing its interpretation of the definition “use,” the report essentially eliminates the educational-information
exclusion, forcing universities to restrict its classroom and laboratory instruction of foreign students as it would with fundamental research.
D. THE FORMATION

OF THE

DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE

BIS announced in the May 2006 Notice that it would establish a
Deemed Export Advisory Committee under the Federal Advisory Committee Act in recognition of the nature and extent of the public comments
received on deemed export control issues.96 Under its Charter, the Advisory Committee was granted broad latitude to recommend changes to the
deemed export rules and their implementation.97 The Advisory Committee is comprised of twelve members, split between government, industry,
academia, and other experts in the field with experience in national security affairs, scientific research and development policy, and the various technologies subject to the EAR.98 The Secretary of Commerce
member who has stopped accepting foreign students because of the cumbersome nature of
the restrictions).
93. See Bureau of Indus. & Sec., Office of Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce,
Final Inspection Report No. IPE-16176, Deemed Export Controls May Not Stop the Transfer of Sensitive Technology to Foreign Nationals in the U.S. (2004), available at http://www.
oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/2004/BIS-IPE-16176-03-2004.pdf.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Establishment of Advisory Committee and Clarification of Deemed Export-Related Regulatory Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. 29,301 (Dep’t of Commerce May 22, 2006),
available at http://www.setonresourcecenter.com/register/2006/May/22/29301A.pdf.
97. See CHARTER OF DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2007), available at http://
tac.bis.doc.gov/deacchart.htm. The Advisory Committee’s first objective under its Charter
is to “develop recommendations for possible improvements to policies on the transfer of
technology or source code subject to the Export Administration Regulations to persons
within the United States.” The BIS will use these recommendations in revising, as appropriate, its controls on deemed exports.
98. Id. On September 12, 2006, U.S. Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez announced
the appointment of twelve members to the Advisory Committee. Secretary Gutierrez
named Norman Augustine, retired Chairman & CEO of Lockheed Martin Corporation and
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appoints members to the Advisory Committee, and no member is to serve
more than one year on the Committee.99
1. DEAC Hears Public Testimony and Comments
The Advisory Committee met in open session on six separate occasions
between October 2006 and September 2007 and received 37 formal and
informal presentations including several from citizens representing
themselves or interested organizations.100 The 26 invited presenters included qualified individuals from governmental organizations, high-tech
corporations and educational institutions, including Presidents and
Provosts from leading United States research universities and senior executives from United States commercial firms.101 Sessions took place at
both the classified and unclassified levels. Persons involved with the
topic of deemed exports representing associations, law firms, and other
interested parties gave informal remarks.
Robert Gates, the President of Texas A&M as Co-Chairs of the Advisory Committee. The
other ten members of the Advisory Committee include: Albert Carnesale, PhD, Former
Chancellor of the University of California at Los Angeles; Ruth David, PhD, President &
CEO, Analytic Services, Inc.; The Honorable John Engler, President, National Association
of Manufacturers; Anthony Frank, PhD, Provost and Senior Vice President, Colorado State
University; General John A. Gordon, Former Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency;
Sean O’Keefe, Chancellor, Louisiana State University; Eva Pell, PhD, Senior Vice President and Dean of the Graduate School, Penn State University; Michael Splinter, CEO, Applied Materials; James Siedow, Vice Provost for Research and Professor of Biology, Duke
University; William A. Wulf, PhD, President, National Academy of Engineering and Professor of Computer Science and University Professor, University of Virginia. See also Press
Release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Commerce Secretary Announces
Advisory Committee to Protect National Security and Increase American Competitiveness
& Innovation (12 Bus. and Academic Leaders Appointed) (Sept. 12, 2006), available at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2006/advisorcommittee09_12_06.htm.
99. Id.; but see Benjamin Findley, Revisions to the United States Deemed-Export Regulations: Implications for Universities, University Research, and Foreign Faculty, Staff, and
Students, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1223 (2006) (suggesting that the Advisory Committee’s politically appointed membership and the breadth of its duties may result in recommendations
reflecting those which have been previously withdrawn).
100. See Agenda for Deemed Export Advisory Committee Meeting (Jan. 22, 2007), available at http://www.aeanet.org/governmentaffairs/gakm_DEACAgendas012207.asp. On
January 22, 2007, an Advisory Committee meeting included: opening remarks from the Cochairs and members of the Advisory Committee; formal stakeholder presentations made by
JPMorgan Chase, Qualcomm, Boeing, and others; two hours for public comments; a press
briefing; an onsite visit to the corporate headquarters of Intel Corporation; and a closed
session for Advisory Committee members.
101. Id. For example, the January 22, 2007 meeting featured Mr. Arthur Bienenstock
from Stanford University; Mr. Don Weadon from Weadon and Associates; Mr. Steve Kott of
AMD; Mr. William B. Linscott, Director of Export Management at Boeing; Kathleen
Gebeau, Director of Export Compliance at Qualcomm; and Mr. Larry Christiansen from
JPMorgan Chase Vastera, Inc.
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These presentations generally pointed to specific recommendations
that the speakers proffered to the Advisory Committee for due consideration.102 Many of the recommendations put forward in the public comments overlapped one another, particularly in two key areas. The first
was the recommendation to streamline and update the Commerce Control List that many felt was out-of-date and in some instances, attempted
to protect obsolete or globally available technologies.103 A second recurring recommendation was to retain the current interpretation of “use” in
the EAR, which meant that the term encapsulates all six of the listed
criteria rather than the Commerce Report’s recommendation to redefine
“use” as any one of the six criteria individually.104
III. POLICIES UNDERLYING UNITED STATES EXPORT
REGULATIONS: EVOLUTION OF THE EAR AND ITAR
As noted above, two sets of regulations govern exports in the U.S. – the
EAR and ITAR. These two regulatory schemes were created under three
different acts: the Export Administration Act of 1979 that led to the creation of the EAR, and the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 that led to the
creation of the ITAR.
The Export Administration Act of 1979 greatly expanded its precursor, the Export Administration Act of 1969.105 The 1979 Act included
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See NAT’L COUNCIL FOR SCI. AND THE ENV’T, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. RL30169,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 REAUTHORIZATION, SUMMARY (2001), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/international/inter22.cfm [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
The 107th Congress has shown an interest in revising the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (“EAA”). The EAA, which had last expired in 1994, was reauthorized
until August 20, 2001 at the end of the 106th Congress (H.R. 5239, P.L. 106-508).
The Export Administration Act of 2001 (S. 149) was introduced by Senator Mike
Enzi on January 23, 2001. The bill would delegate to the executive branch express
constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce. This delegation of export
controls has traditionally been temporary, and when it has lapsed, the President
has declared a national emergency and maintained export control regulations
under the authority of an executive order. The EAA, which was written and
amended during the Cold War, focuses on the regulation of exports of those civilian goods and technology that have military applications (dual-use items). Export
controls were based on strategic relationships, threats to U.S. national security,
international business practices, and commercial technologies that have changed
dramatically in the last 20 years. Many Members of Congress and most U.S. business representatives see a need to liberalize U.S. export regulations to allow
American companies to engage in generally unrestrained international competition for sales of high-technology goods. But, there are also many Members and
national security analysts who contend that liberalization of export controls over
the last decade has contributed to foreign threats to U.S. national security, that
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expansive “Findings” and “Congressional Declaration of Policy” sections
and also established the Commerce Control List.106 Particularly, the Act
shed light on the national security and economic motivations behind the
legislation. For example, the Act provided that, to the maximum extent
possible, the controlled technology was to be restricted to “militarily critical goods and technologies.”107 In addition, the Act stated that it should
limit controlled technology to the extent that it is available in other countries, contemplating international cooperation in the control of sensitive
goods.108
In light of the recent proposed revisions to the EAR suggested by the
BIS, a number of congressional policy declarations in the Act remain relevant, especially since a national security rationale forms the basis of the
revisions. Policy statements relevant to the current revisions are as
follows:
(2) It is the policy of the United States to use export controls only after
full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and
only to the extent necessary—
(A) to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a
significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or
combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the national
security of the United States;
(B) to restrict the export of goods and technology where necessary to
further significantly the foreign policy of the United States or to fulfill
its declared international obligations.109

First, the language added to the 1969 Act in section (2), “only after
full consideration of the impact on the economy of the United States and
only to the extent necessary,”110 indicates Congress’s intent to have export controls promulgated only after weighing the effect of those regulations on the economy. This statement of purpose significantly
contemplates restrictions on research, which is a driving force of a
knowledge-based national economy. Second, the language in sections
(2)(A) and (B)111 suggest the role of export controls in fighting international terrorism, which is extremely relevant post 9/11. Sections (8) and
(9),112 however, both seem to support a more cooperative, multilateral
approach to fighting international terrorism. Section (8) provides: “to
some controls should be tightened, and that Congress should weigh further liberalization carefully.
106. Id.
107. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1981) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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achieve this objective [using export controls to prevent support of international terrorism], the President shall make reasonable and prompt efforts to secure the removal or reduction of such assistance to
international terrorists through international cooperation and agreement before imposing export controls.”113
Congress’s explicit limitation, “the President shall make . . . efforts
. . . through international cooperation and agreement before imposing
export controls,”114 in combination with weighing the economic effects of
imposing controls as suggested in section (2), the limitation appears to
provide for a pro research-based approach to export regulations. Furthermore, section (9) provides:
[I]t is the policy of the United States to cooperate with other countries
with which the United States has defense treaty commitments or common strategic objectives in restricting the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military
potential of any country or combination of countries which would prove
detrimental to the security of the United States.115

This section, like section (8), suggests that Congress contemplated a
cooperative and multilateral approach to keeping sensitive technology
from leakage to countries of concern, threatening U.S. national security.
IV. THE DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S
RECOMMENDATIONS PROPOSE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES
TO THE DEEMED EXPORT REGULATIONS
A. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE HIGHLIGHTS THE OBSOLESCENCE
COLD WAR ERA REGULATIONS IN THE CURRENT
KNOWLEDGE-DRIVEN ECONOMY

OF

Partly in response to strong criticism from universities and industry of
the Commerce Department’s 2005 Report, the Deemed Export Advisory
Committee arose in 2006 to review current deemed export controls comprehensively.116 The Advisory Committee’s findings generally reflect
the observations of Professor John W. Houghton in his book, “The Global
113. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (1981) (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (2000)).
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Id.
116. CHARTER OF DEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE (2007), available at http://tac.
bis.doc.gov/deacchart.htm.
United States DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
CHARTER OF THEDEEMED EXPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The Secretary of Commerce (“Secretary”), pursuant to duties imposed by law upon
the Department, including the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (50
United StatesC. app. §§ 2401- 2420 (2000)), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 United StatesC. §§ 1701 - 1706 (2000)), and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, (5 United StatesC. app. § 2 (2005)), and with the concur-
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rence of the General Services Administration, hereby renews the Deemed Exports
Advisory Committee (DEAC).
OBJECTIVES AND DUTIES
1. The DEAC will develop recommendations for possible improvements to policies
on the transfer of technology or source code subject to the Export Administration
Regulations to persons within the United States. These recommendations are intended to be used by the Secretary, the Under Secretary for Industry and Security
(“Under Secretary”), and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and
Security (“BIS”) in revising, as appropriate, its controls on such exports.
2. The DEAC will update the Secretary regularly on its progress during the development of its recommendations and will agree upon the contents of its recommendations before advising the Secretary to adopt any or all of them.
3. The DEAC will function solely as an advisory body and will comply with the
requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
MEMBERSHIP
1. The DEAC shall not exceed 12 members to be appointed by the Secretary to
assure a balanced representation of views among business executives, university
administrators, and other experts in the field. Members will be Special Government Employees.
2. Members shall have a current Secret clearance in order to analyze intelligence
products relevant to their work.
3. Each member shall be appointed for 12 months and will serve at the discretion
of the Secretary. Appointments shall be renewable for additional terms.
4. The Secretary shall appoint the Chairperson or Co-Chairpersons. The Secretary
may also appoint one or more Vice-Chairpersons.
5. Members will be subject to all ethical standards and rules applicable to Special
Government Employees.
6. Members will be selected on a clear, standardized basis, in accordance with applicable Department of Commerce guidance.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
1. The DEAC shall report on its activities and recommendations to the Secretary
or to other individuals within the Department of Commerce that the Secretary
may designate.
2. The Secretary shall appoint the Under Secretary as the Executive Director of
the DEAC. The Under Secretary shall not be a member of the DEAC.
3. The Director of BIS’s Office of National Security and Technology Transfer Controls shall be the DEAC Designated Federal Officer (DFO), and Committee staffing will be coordinated through his/her office.
4. The DEAC shall meet as deemed necessary by the Secretary, but in no case less
than quarterly.
5. BIS shall provide funding and administrative support for the Committee.
6. Members of the DEAC shall not be compensated for their service, but shall on
request be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as
authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in government service (5
United StatesC. §§ 5701 - 5707), consistent with the availability of funds.
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Knowledge Economy.”117 Houghton explains this phenomenon in the
following terms:
A knowledge-based economy is so fundamentally different from the resource-based system of the last century that conventional economic understanding must be re-examined. The knowledge economy increasingly
relies on the diffusion and use of knowledge, as well as its creation.
Hence the success of enterprises, and of national economies as a whole,
will become more reliant upon their effectiveness in gathering, absorbing and utilizing knowledge, as well as in its creation.
A knowledge economy is, in effect, a hierarchy of networks, driven by
the acceleration of the rate of change and the rate of learning, where the
opportunity and capability to get access to and join knowledge-intensive
and learning-intensive relations determines the socio-economic position
of individuals and firms.118

Houghton’s concept of a knowledge-driven economy, dependent on
the interconnectedness of its networks, is critical to any discussion of
deemed export regulations because these controls determine and limit
the distribution of technological knowledge to foreign nationals studying
or working in the United States.119
In a knowledge economy, according to Professor Houghton, the interconnectedness refers to the people and firms searching for “linkages to
promote inter-personal and inter-firm learning, and for outside partners
and networks to provide complementary assets.”120 These relationships
help spread the costs and risks associated with innovation, provide additional talent, gain access to new research results, acquire key technologic
7. The DEAC may establish subcommittees of its members as necessary, subject to
the relevant provisions of the Department of Commerce Committee Management
Handbook. The Secretary or his designee shall designate the Chairperson and
members of any subcommittee.
8. The annual cost of operating DEAC is estimated to be $150,000, which includes
0.5 person years of staff support.
9. The DFO or his/her delegee shall be responsible for filings and other applicable
statutory requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
DURATION
This charter shall terminate 12 months from the date of filing with the appropriate United States Senate and House of Representatives Oversight Committees,
unless earlier terminated or renewed by proper authority. Id.
117. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7; but see John W. Houghton, The Global
Knowledge Economy 13 (2002), available at http://web.archive.org/web/20071010165323/
http://www.tiac.wa.gov.au/directions/paper1/paper1.html.
118. John W. Houghton, The Global Knowledge Economy 13 (2002), available at http://
web.archive.org/web/20071010165323/http://www.tiac.wa.gov.au/directions/paper1/paper1.
html.
119. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 53.
120. Houghton, supra note 118.
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components, and share assets in manufacturing, marketing, and distribution.121 The ability of the system to distribute knowledge and ensure
its delivery in a timely manner is critical in determining the success of
its participants.122
Realizing that the issue of knowledge distribution goes directly to
the core of the deemed export regulations, the Advisory Committee suggests that limitations on the flow of knowledge have negative potential
consequences for both the nation’s economy and its national security.123
Deemed export rules at a basic level can significantly influence an organization’s decision of who works on what research.124 The government
seeks such restrictions to prevent foreign nationals from transferring
sensitive technology with significant military applications to a country of
“presumed” concern. For example, deemed export restrictions on a foreign national’s access to high productivity computer systems
(“HPCS”)125 have a profound impact on both the economy and national
security.126 Although HPCS have military applications, other countries
and foreign nationals working and studying throughout the United
States and abroad produce HPCS as well.127 Moreover, they have many
commercial applications such as commercial aircraft design, ship performance analysis, commercial satellite design, and other non-military
applications that continue to advance the overall technology curve.128 A
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 53.
124. Letter from Christopher R. Calabrese, Counsel, Tech. & Liberty Program, and
Barry Steinhardt, Dir., Tech. & Liberty Program to Matthew S. Borman, Deputy Assistant
Sec’y for Export Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Jun. 27, 2005) (on file with author).
125. See Aad J. van der Steen, Overview of Recent Supercomputers, available at http://
www.nwo.nl/files.nsf/pages/NWOP_5V9EK7/$file/Overview_SC-AadvdSteen-2008.pdf.
“HPCS” stands for High Productivity Computer Systems which is a program initiated by
“DARPA,” the U.S. Army Agency that provides large-scale financial support to future
(sometimes futuristic) research that might benefit the U.S. Army in some way. The HPCS
program was set up to ensure that by 2010 computer systems will exist that are capable of
a performance of 1 Pflop/s in real applications as opposed to the Theoretical Peak Performance which might be much higher. Initially Cray, HP, IBM, SGI, and SUN participated in
the program. After repeated evaluations, only Cray and IBM still get support from the
HPCS program. Id.
126. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees on Export
Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for High Performance Computer Exports 3-4 (1998), available at www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/gao98200.pdf. In
1998, the Executive Branch determined that High Performance Computer Systems
(“HPCS”) are a critical national asset for designing or improving advanced nuclear explosives and advanced conventional weapons capabilities. It identified significant military applications, including cryptology, battle management and target engagement, joint theater
missile defense, information superiority, and electronic warfare. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Steen, supra note 125.
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tough question emerges in light of HPCS applications in today’s knowledge-driven economy: “Do deemed export restrictions on the use of HPCS
by highly qualified foreign national students and workers in the United
States protect national security, or do they simply inhibit innovation and
harm the United States’ position in the world economy?”129
The dilemma of regulating HPCS encapsulates only part of the problem that the Advisory Committee addressed in its review of export controls. The Advisory Committee grapples with a much broader issue at a
fundamental level – specifically, that in “today’s post-Cold War globalizing, internet-connected world, knowledge is a commodity that is exceptionally difficult to control if for no other reason than that it can be
stored in the human brain, and humans are becoming increasingly
mobile.”130
1. Findings of the Advisory Committee
In its report, the Advisory Committee found that the obsolescence of
the current deemed export regime has been brought about by “profound
developments in science and technology, the free-flow of massive
amounts of information, the mobility of the world’s populace, the burgeoning economies of other nations, and the change in the character of
threats to America’s security.”131 In addition, the Advisory Committee
explicitly rebuked the U.S. Department of State’s recent policy proposal,
which would permit access to ITAR export-controlled information to
United States-educated foreign nationals who emigrate to a European
Union or NATO country.132 Under the proposal, such European Union
nationals could join foreign companies and subsequently be considered
authorized under an approved license or Technical Assistance Agreement.133 The Advisory Committee found this policy to conflict with other
129. ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 55. On December 10, 2003, the Bureau of
Industry and Security amended the Export Administration Act to implement the December
2002 revisions to the Wassenaar List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. This regulatory
update raised the composite theoretical performance (“CTP”) control level for high performance computers from 28,000 millions of theoretical operations per second (“MTOPS”) to
190,000 MTOPS. Now, the EAR allows exports and imports of computers with CTP not
exceeding 190,000 MTOPS. For HPC licensing requirements to other destinations, refer to
section 742.12 of the EAR. See Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Archive of
HPC News Items, available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/hpcs/archivednewsitems.html (last
visited on November 10, 2008).
130. ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 57.
131. Letter from Norman Augustine, Chairman, Deemed Export Advisory Comm., to
the Honorable Carlos Gutierrez, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file with
author).
132. ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, Supra note 7, at 59-60.
133. See Export Controls: Are We Protecting Security and Facilitating Exports: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade of the H. Comm. on For-
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current United States export regulations since it assumes a homogeneous population in the European Union and NATO.134
To the contrary, many European Union and NATO countries regularly naturalize émigrés with advanced degrees in science and technology, which would thereby grant these people access, under the
Department of State’s proposal, to critical military knowledge and technology.135 Such a scheme is inherently ironic and contradictory because
while knowledge restrictions (deemed export licensing) would apply to a
brilliant foreign national researcher seeking to advance the level of technology while studying within the United States, the same researcher
would be allowed unrestricted access to the same or better technology as
a naturalized citizen of a NATO or European Union country.136
Beyond mere inconsistencies, the Advisory Committee principally
found that “the existing deemed export regulatory regime no longer effectively serves its intended purpose and should be replaced with an approach that better reflects the realities of today’s national security needs
and global economy.”137
2. Advisory Committee Recommendations
In finding that the current deemed export regulations possess a number of shortcomings, the Advisory Committee made two general recommendations,138 as well as a seven-step decision-making construct.139
The Advisory Committee’s report depicts the construct graphically140
and presumably with the intent to be used as a decision-making tree for
determining when to submit a deemed export license application and
under what circumstances it should be approved. Additionally, the Advisory Committee proscribed a series of specific implementing actions.141
Undergirding the Advisory Committee’s recommendations lies a rationale that reforming export regulations requires a strengthening of the
existing partnership between government and private actors (universieign Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Stephen D. Mull, Assistant Sec’y of State for
Political Military Affairs), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/89520.htm.
134. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 60.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 85; see Letter from Anthony DeCrappeo, President, Council on Governmental
Relations, and Robert Berdahl, President, Ass’n of Am. Universities, to Bureau of Indus. &
Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Aug. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
138. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 85-7.
139. Id. at 90-4.
140. Id. at 89.
141. Id. at 85-8.
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ties, industry, contractors).142 The Advisory Committee first recommended that the current deemed export licensing process should be
simplified for industry and universities in order to “enhance national security,” while strengthening America’s economic competitiveness.143 Additionally, the Advisory Committee suggested that because there is an
uneven distribution of firms and universities currently seeking deemed
export licenses (i.e., Intel Corporation has applied for approximately
1,200 licenses), 144 BIS should extend its education outreach program to
help assure that all parties potentially subject to licensing are familiar
with the rules.145 Only through a strengthened relationship can the
deemed export regime begin to adequately address the issues of today’s
globalized world.
a.

Implementing Actions

In order to implement these broad goals, the Advisory Committee suggested a series of implementing actions. First, a group of independent
experts should systematically review the Commerce Control List to
“eliminate items and technology that have little or no such consequences
for national security.”146 The panel would consist of experts in the fields
of science and engineering with the task of conducting an annual “sunset” review (i.e., “zero-based” analysis)147 of the list of technologies subject to the Commerce Control List.148 The guiding principle of the panel
would be to build higher fences around those elements of technical
knowledge and military advantage with the greatest consequences for
national security, while decreasing the existing walls around large fields
of inconsequential technology.149 Ultimately, those seeking to add or
preserve items to the proscribed list would bear the burden of proof of
showing necessity.150
Second, a category of “trusted entities” would voluntarily elect to
qualify for special, streamlined treatment in the processing of deemed
142. Id. at 9. The Center for Strategic and International Studies also suggested that
government-university and government-industry partnerships are the best approach to
strengthen the deemed export regulations.
143. Id. at 85.
144. See Letter from Jeff Rittener, Global Export Compliance Manager, Intel Corp. to
Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
145. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7, 85.
146. Id.
147. Notice of Inquiry, 73 Fed. Reg. 28795 (Dep’t of Commerce May 19, 2008). A zerobased review means determining what should be controlled without reference to what is
currently controlled, rather than reviewing current controls and identifying what should be
decontrolled.
148. See ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 86.
149. Id. at 91.
150. Id. at 87.
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export license applications.151 Academic and industrial research institutions would qualify for such status by complying with certain specified
criteria (notably a deemed export compliance program and annual audits
by BIS).152 Qualifying institutions would be able to move individuals
within the bounds of the entity without applying for separated deemed
export licenses, and would be able to expedite treatment in processing of
deemed export applications (when necessary).153
Third, assessments of a foreign national’s loyalty would be more
thorough and comprehensive.154 Beyond inquiries of permanent residence or current citizenship, potential licensees would disclose their
country of birth, all prior countries of residence and citizenship, as well
as the character of prior and present activities and affiliations.155 The
Advisory Committee presumes that a meticulous examination of the licensee’s current and previous affiliations is necessary to reveal an individual’s probable loyalties, thus decreasing the applicant’s security
risk.156
Fourth, the current distinction drawn between the product of research and knowledge regarding the equipment exploited during the research is moot and irrelevant.157 In order to avoid the long-enduring
debate in defining “use” technology and its applicability to the deemed
export regulations, BIS would need to adopt a rule governing the transfer of knowledge that does not require distinguishing among research
results, the use of research equipment, manufacturing know-how, or
other specific categories of knowledge.158 A simpler and more determinative process would eliminate the “and/or” considerations currently applied in evaluating “use” exemptions to the deemed export
regulations.159 Absent the adoption of such a rule, the “and” provision in
the current “use” definition should be narrowly interpreted to require all
six activities.160
Fifth, a more conventional definition of “fundamental research”
should replace the current definition that relies on the meaning of “ordinarily published” results.161 Currently, the definition of “fundamental
research” in the current export administration regulations is, “research
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 86.
ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 87.
ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 88.
Id. at 87.
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where the resulting information is ordinarily published and shared
broadly within the scientific community.”162 The new definition of fundamental research would eliminate such reliance on the circular meaning of “ordinarily published” by excluding “curiosity-driven research
seeking new knowledge.”163 Absent the adoption of the simpler and
more determinative definitions, the current fundamental research provisions should remain unchanged.
Sixth, the Advisory Committee suggested increasing the use of interactive, web-based self-teaching programs to those subject to deemed export regulations.164 This effort would emphasize self-compliance in
academic and industry research environments by clearly laying out the
requirements of the deemed export rule.
b.

Deemed Export Decision-Making Construct

In addition to its general recommendations and implementing actions, the Advisory Committee proposed a decision construct, depicted
graphically and consisting of seven steps.165 These steps incorporate
and expound upon the Advisory Committee’s implementation actions. In
brief, the steps include:
1. Assess the probable loyalty of individual;
2. Determine whether information is classified;
3. Determine whether military application of the knowledge is substantive and truly significant (“high walls around small fields”);
4. Determine whether knowledge is readily available from non-United
States sources;
5. Determine whether activity is fundamental research (possible definitional change);
6. Determine if organization is a Trusted Entity;
7. Determine risk/benefits of any remaining adverse consequences to
releasing the information.166

At step one, the applying organization would provide the names and
relevant information concerning individual applicants to the government
for review.167 As previously mentioned in the committee’s third implementing act, assessing probable loyalty, the government would review
the applicant’s prior and present activities, prior countries of residence,
162. 15 C.F.R. § 734.8; ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7, at 92.
163. ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7, at 9.
164. See Id.
165. Id. at 89. As depicted, the seven steps are sequential, each requiring a “no” answer
in order to progress to the next step. A “yes” answer at any step has three different outcomes, “application denied,” “no license required,” or “case-by-case basis.”
166. Id.
167. Id. at 90.
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Step
Application
Denied

(Yes)

Is the individual’s
loyalty tied to a
country of concern?

I

(No)

Application
Denied

(Yes)

Is the information
classified by the
military?

II

(No)

Application
Denied

(Yes)

Is the military
application truly
significant?

III

(No)

No License
Required
(see Step IV text)

(Yes)

Is the knowledge
accessible
anywhere?

IV

(No)

No License
Required

(Yes)

Is the activity
Fundamental
Research?

V

(No)

No License
Required

(Yes)

Is organization qualified
as a “Trusted Entity”?

VI

(No)

Submit Licence with
supporting information
(case-by-case)

(Yes)

Are there adverse
military or commercial
impacts of denial?
(No)

VII

Application
Approved
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and other sensitive details to determine whether the individual would
pose a security risk.168 Presumably, such a risk would involve a tie between the individual and a country on the United States government’s
proscribed list (generally terrorist-supporting) or other significant loyalty concern.169 If the government is satisfied that the licensee is not a
security risk based on probable loyalty to a country of concern, licensing
assessment proceeds to step two.
Step two incorporates the most powerful factor in determining controls on access to technology – security classification. The government
will rarely accept an application for classified information, and will only
accept the application in highly exceptional situations as determined by
the government because of the sensitive implications of the knowledge
on national security.170 If the information is not classified, however, the
assessment proceeds to step three. Even if the information and knowledge is not classified, it may have military applications that can still pose
a threat to homeland security.171 As suggested before, the approach “is
to build high walls around small fields rather than, as is present practice, nominal walls around large fields.” 172 Therefore, step three requires a determination “whether the military application of the
knowledge in questions is both substantive and truly significant to the
nation.”173 The government would reject applications for technology
with truly significant consequences for national security, but the applications would subsequently be included on the list for review by the expert
panel in its annual zero-based review of the Commerce Control List.174
If the technology is not classified and does not have substantive or
truly significant military applications, assessment proceeds to step four.
Step four requires a determination whether the knowledge being assessed is readily available outside of the United States.175 Technology or
knowledge that is the equivalent to that sought for licensing and which
is readily available from other sources outside of the United States
would not require a license.176 Nonetheless, the United States may still
decide to subject the technology to licensing requirements where it de168. Id. at 86.
169. ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 7, at 90.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 91. Critical aspects of those few technologies that could produce truly major
threats “(for example, certain aspects of nuclear weapon related technology, toxic biological
agents, chemical warfare related agents, cryptography – and perhaps a few contemporary,
pivotal technological breakthroughs – such as night vision, stealth, advanced composites
and electronic countermeasures.)”
172. Id. (Internal quotations omitted.)
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 91.
176. Id.
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cides, as a matter of principle, to refuse to assist an individual even
though that individual can gain such assistance elsewhere.177 This exception would be extremely rare.
At step five, an assessment is made whether the activity at hand
constitutes fundamental research, therefore removing it from the purview of deemed export licensing requirements.178 As the Advisory Committee suggested earlier, the more conventional definition of
“fundamental research”179 – “curiosity-driven research seeking new
knowledge”180 – would replace the current definition. Alternatively,
deemed export licensing requirements would exclude research if it “is not
precluded from publication in the relevant contractual documents or
other regulatory mechanisms.”181
Step six hinges on the creation of “trusted entities,” and whether the
applicant qualifies as such. It is important to note, however, that classified or sensitive military knowledge would never progress to the point of
consideration for qualification as a trusted entity.182 While previous discussion sets forth the benefits of maintaining these organizations, qualification as such an organization would require a number of criteria.183
First, the organization must demonstrate a history of responsible conduct with regard to export control matters and conduct a training program for its employees to ensure compliance with the deemed export
regulations.184 Second, the organization would self-process its licensing
needs, taking into account input or guidance from the government when
appropriate and report periodically on its licensing activities.185 This
would include disclosure of all persons receiving controlled information.
Third, the organization must immediately report any violations it is
aware of to the government and permit annual government audits for
requalification.186 If an organization, industrial or academic, qualifies as
a trusted entity, “it can make a self-determination of the appropriateness
of the proposed transfer action187 by implementing the seven step
177. Id. at 92.
178. Id.
179. 15 C.F.R. § 734.8; ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 92. “Research where the
resulting information is ordinarily published and shared broadly within the scientific community.” 15 C.F.R. § 734.8.
180. ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 92.
181. Id. at 93.
182. Id. at 92.
183. Id. at 93.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 93.
187. However, the implementation of this recommendation remains rather ambiguous
and is unclear from the Report.
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process.”188
Lastly, step seven requires a safety-net assessment of whether the
remaining military, commercial, or political concerns outweigh the benefits of the proposed release.189 Although very few cases will reach this
step, it remains important to allow considerations of “those extraordinary cases that may simply not be addressable by rules intended for the
ordinary course of business.”190 A case-by-case analysis will make the
determinations, judging on the merits, considering the abovementioned
factors.191
V. BIS MUST NARROWLY INTERPRET THE DEAC’S
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CLEARLY AND EFFECTIVELY
ADDRESS SPECIFIC POLICY OBJECTIVES WITHOUT
EXCESSIVELY AND INAPPROPRIATELY BURDENING RESEARCH
The Advisory Committee’s report contained several recommendations
to improve and streamline BIS’s deemed export rule. Narrowing the
scope of technologies on the Commerce Control List subject to deemed
export licensing requirements and conducting an outside review of technologies is particularly important because of the increasingly global nature of the scientific and engineering enterprise and the critical need for
the United States scientific community to partner in that enterprise.192
With great enthusiasm, the scientific and research communities have applauded this recommendation. Nonetheless, despite overwhelming support for such recommendations, a number of issues remain.
The Association of American Universities-Council on Governmental
Relations193 and numerous companies worry that the Advisory Committee’s recommendation to expand the determination of national affiliation
188. ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 93.
189. Id. at 94.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. DeCrappeo, supra note 137. “We fully concur with the DEAC’s basic finding that
too many technologies are subject to deemed export control. We believe the list of covered
technologies should be drastically reduced.” (emphasis in original.) “We believe that
deemed export requirements should be applied to only a very narrow subset of technologies.” Id.
193. The Association of American Universities (“AAU”) represents 60 U.S. public and
private research universities and is devoted to maintaining a strong national system of
academic research and education. See Association of American Universities, About AAU,
http://www.aau.edu/about/default.aspx?id=58 (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). The Council on
Governmental Relations (“COGR”) is an association of 178 research-intensive universities,
affiliated hospitals, and research institutes that is specifically concerned with the impact of
government regulations, policies, and practices on the performance of research conducted
at its member institutions. See Council on Governmental Relations About COGR, http://
www.cogr.edu/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 30, 2008). COGR, AAU, and their member institutions participated/hosted many of the Advisory Committees’ regional public meetings.
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to include country of birth, as recommended earlier by the Commerce
Department’s Inspector General, creates significant concerns in the areas of civil liberties, privacy, and compliance.194 Additionally, the Advisory Committee never addressed troublesome restrictive research
clauses for sensitive but unclassified projects, which force universities to
lose its fundamental research exclusion. Specifically, the government’s
increased reliance on such clauses considerably erodes the fundamental
principles found in NSDD-189. Finally, although the Advisory Committee mentions that the threat of foreign intelligence collection efforts
against the U.S. have fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold
War, the Committee’s recommendations do not reflect the reality that
rogue scientists and industrialists motivated by greed or self-acclaim,
not agents of the state, are more likely to attempt to steal controlled
technology. Moreover, the legal fiction that foreign nationals who become privy to sensitive information will automatically transfer it to a
country of concern – a presumption central to the current deemed export
rule – was not a part of the deemed export regime until 1995 and should
not continue to play a part in the current regulations.
On May 19, 2008, BIS published a notice of inquiry in order to elicit
comments regarding two specific recommendations made by the Advisory Committee with respect to BIS’s deemed export licensing policy.195
First, BIS sought comments on whether it should use a more comprehensive set of criteria to assess country affiliation for foreign nationals with
respect to deemed exports.196 Second, BIS requested comments on
whether it should narrow the scope of technologies on the Commerce
Control List that are subject to deemed export licensing requirements,
and if so, which technologies should be subject to deemed export licensing requirements.197
A. BASING LICENSE DECISIONS ON THE “PROBABLE LOYALTIES” OF
POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGY RECIPIENTS IS AN INADMINISTRABLE
AND ERROR-PRONE PROCESS
A more comprehensive assessment of a foreign national’s country of
affiliation that includes country of birth, prior countries of residence,
current citizenship, and the character of an individual’s prior and present activities does not benefit national security enough to justify the
potential costs to implement such a system. Moreover, the Advisory
Committee’s reason for expanding the criteria, to provide an increased
level of assurance that unauthorized end-users or activities would not
194.
195.
196.
197.

DeCrappeo, supra note 137.
See Notice of Inquiry, 73 Fed. Reg. 28795 (Dep’t of Commerce May 19, 2008).
Id.
Id.
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receive technology subject to deemed export licensing requirements, is
overly restrictive. The Advisory Committee reasoned that the current
practice of using the most recent citizenship or legal permanent residency may not take into account the actual risk of diversion of exportcontrolled technology by the foreign national.198 For instance, it noted
that most criminal cases of export control violations of which it was
aware involve United States citizens and United States legal permanent
residents, who are not even subject to deemed export licensing requirements under current BIS policy.199
Further, the Advisory Committee stated there is no adequate distinction for a foreign national residing in a specific country for the majority of his or her lifetime who subsequently moves to a new country. For
example, the risk of diversion posed by an individual recently attaining
U.K. citizenship who was born and raised in Iran may be different from
that of a native Iranian who became a citizen of the U.K. shortly after
birth.200 Despite its well-founded concerns addressed below, the Advisory Committee’s recommendation to include additional criteria is overbroad, extremely costly, lacks empirical evidence, and implicates
violations of civil liberties.
1. Compliance with the Recommendation is Problematic for
Companies
Adding new, and arguably more subjective, criteria would be highly
problematic for United States companies, would artificially and unnecessarily increase the number of license submissions, and in the end would
be counterproductive to the Advisory Committee’s avowed objective to
simplify the license process. It is manifestly inappropriate for companies
to question a government’s decision, including our own, to confer legal
residency or citizenship upon an individual. Furthermore, given the current state of global mobility, it is unreasonable from a purely licensing
perspective to expect companies to submit a license every time a factor
suggests a problematic country affiliation (as recommended by the Advisory Committee). These circumstances would undoubtedly come up with
some frequency. Adoption of the recommendations would lead to unwelcome complications and delay in the hiring and deployment of foreign
nationals and, ultimately, a more complex and taxing licensing process
for both industry and the government.
Placing the burden on United States companies to define these and
other gray area criteria would require delving into areas of inquiry that
could open up potential employment discrimination litigation and add
198. See ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7, at 17.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 19.
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burdensome compliance risks, while resulting in a procedurally problematic and expensive divergence from current and accepted employment
and technology access practices.201 The government should instead focus
on continuing enhancements to the visa process, better coordination with
existing security controls in other areas of commerce, as well as enhanced information sharing between government agencies in order to
identify and deter individuals (either foreign or otherwise) with agendas
contrary to United States national security interests. Companies should
be able to rely on the visa process to explore and determine on a personal
basis, which foreign nationals pose security threats to the United States
and deny entry on that determination. Certainly, the Federal Government is in a better position to make the needed inquiries to make determinations about such individual threats.
United States companies greatly rely on foreign research talent and
they cannot afford to maintain unnecessary restrictions that deter such
individuals from participating in important research. According to the
most recent Science and Engineering Indicators of the 2006 report issued
by the National Science Board, the United States’ dependence on foreignborn scientists and engineers is increasing.202 The Board’s data show
that the percent of foreign-born national science and engineering workers rose from 14% to 22% from 1990-2000.203 The largest increase (as a
subcategory of this trend) was for doctorate holders, which rose from 24%
to 38% in important science and technology specialties.204 More than
half of the 2006 graduating engineers in the United States holding doctorates and 45% of Ph.D.s in the physical sciences, computer sciences,
and life sciences were foreign born.205 One-third of this group came from
India, China, or the Philippines.206 Among science and engineering doctorate holders working in the United States, one-third of this total group
came from India and China.207
The Advisory Committee’s recommendation would have a detrimental impact on current and prospective employees. If adopted, many companies would face huge setbacks in current research projects by having
to question each foreign researcher’s loyalty. In calendar year 2003, for201. “Under the current deemed export regulatory regime, we estimate that GE’s dedicated team of trade controls compliance attorneys, leaders and specialists spend at least
20% of their time and resources managing issues related to deemed exports.” Letter from
Kathleen Lockard Palma, Counsel, Int’l Trade Regulation, Gen. Elec., to Bureau of Indus.
& Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
202. See NAT’L SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2006 (2006),
available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/pdfstart.htm.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-4\SFT405.txt

2009]

unknown

Seq: 37

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH UNDER SEIGE

20-APR-10

7:20

583

eign national students holding temporary visas earned one-third (8,700
of 26,900) of the total number of doctorates (in all fields) awarded in the
United States.208 Within that subset, more than half of the foreign national degrees (approximately 4,400) earned were in engineering fields of
study.209 Of the remainder, foreign nationals earned 44% of mathematical and computer science doctorates, and foreign nationals earned 35% of
the physical science doctorates.210 These precautions are unnecessary
because businesses already protect their valuable technologies by maintaining a number of internal controls and because the recommendation
fails to offer any greater security protection.
Research-intensive companies currently utilize intellectual property
protection, non-disclosure agreements, and employee screening to protect their valuable technology. These protections are in place because
companies have strong commercial incentives to maintain strict confidentiality when undertaking expensive research projects. Furthermore,
research-intensive companies usually hire non-United States researchers on a permanent basis. Rather than preventing diversion of sensitive
technology, the Advisory Committee policy may only increase efforts to
falsify employee documentation.
The recommendation would also impose additional financial and administrative costs. Mandating additional “potential” criteria for interpretation, applied to a wide variety of individual circumstances and
subsequent evaluation, will greatly increase the burden on companies
and on the government. Companies will have to collect significant additional information and, in many cases from multiple sources in order to
ensure completeness, to evaluate its potential significance. General
Electric estimates that maintaining a system of background checks,
training, and management of its required licenses would cost more than
$1 million exclusive of the effect on nonemployees, global operations, and
other GE businesses.211
Technology kept within the confines of a company or university
should not require individual licensing, particularly to share with employees or students inside the United States. Empowering companies to
rely on internal control programs and to leverage their strong internal
controls around intellectual property protection will increase efficiency
and benefit national security by ensuring that resources are devoted to
the highest and best use by industry and government. Companies are
208. NAT’L SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 202.
209. Id.
210. Id. Only about 900 (approximately 10%) of the 8,700 total doctorates awarded to
foreign nationals in 2003 were in non-S&T fields of study. In pre-graduation surveys,
many of these students stated that they planned to stay in the United States after they
completed their education, although this is a trend that is gradually reversing.
211. See Palma, supra note 201.
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better equipped to maintain internal control systems on technology to
prevent the unlawful diversion of technology rather than to conduct in
depth evaluations of the affiliations of their employees.
2. Implementing the Recommendation is Problematic for Universities
Expanding the determination of national affiliation of licensees also
presents many problems for universities, especially those who rely on
foreign talent for research. Universities do not have the information, expertise, or resources to conduct full background and loyalty checks thoroughly on its foreign students and employees.212 Expecting campuses to
determine the potential loyalties and affiliations of its foreign students,
beyond their citizenship, is an unreasonable burden and a poor means by
which to ensure national security.213 In addition to imposing significant
costs on each university for providing staff, training, and time, the recommendation raises “serious questions about privacy and civil liberties
that arises when the federal government makes distinctions based on
national origin or perceived foreign loyalties.”214 The assumption that
all individuals who hold affiliations with a particular country still may
hold some foreign allegiance, although they are not citizens of that country, is overly broad.215 Such blanket policies threaten and curtail fundamental values and freedoms that the United States has a tradition of
staunchly defending. Instead of expanding the criteria in a way that
might contradict the nation’s fundamental beliefs, the Association of
American Universities-Council on Government Relations suggest an alternative way to determine foreign loyalty:
A foreign national from a country of concern for a particular technology
should be excluded from access to that controlled technology only if the
person transferring the technical information to a foreign national has
specific and credible information that this individual will: a) export controlled technology abroad to a country for which the technology is controlled, or b) commit or support an attack on the United States with
information they have obtained about a controlled technology.216

Imparting a “knowledge” standard into determinations of loyalty
also reflects the findings of the Advisory Committee regarding foreign
collection efforts.217
The current deemed export rule is premised on a legal fiction that
domestic transfers of technical knowledge and information with non-U.S.
212. See DeCrappeo, supra note 137.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 70-3. This standard was the applicable
rule for determining deemed exports prior to 1994. See 15 C.F.R. § 779.1(b)(1) (1993).
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students are, in every case, equivalent to an export and that government
authorization, special requirements, and conditions are necessary to
safeguard national security. In fact, absent specific evidence or indications to the contrary, there is not meaningful basis to presume that a
transfer of technology to a foreign national in the United States will result in an unauthorized export or diversion. To the contrary, there is no
indication of harming national security from relying on the current test
of national affiliation – country of citizenship. Nor is there a rationale as
to how such a background review would decrease the likelihood of a foreign national disclosing controlled information in a way that would harm
United States national security. There is simply no demonstrated need
or justification for universities to try to look beyond legal citizenship as a
means of predicting future unlawful diversion of technology, especially
considering the significant costs. Regardless of the criteria BIS decides
to adopt, the deemed export rule excludes U.S. citizens, residents, or
green card holders, which are precisely the group responsible for the majority of corporate espionage violations.
The current legal fiction fundamental to operation of the current
deemed export regime contradicts government reports regarding scientific and industrial espionage. According to the Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2005 report, “most foreign students and
academics working in United States research institutions are not involved with United States technology theft. In fact, many significantly
contribute to the advancement of research at their respective universities and institutes.”218 Although a record number of 108 countries were
involved in collection efforts against sensitive and protected United
States technologies,219 only a small number of countries, including
China and Russia, accounted for much of the targeting.220
Moreover, evidence suggests that the vast majority of those who did attempt to steal technology or trade secrets did not initially come to the
United States with that intent nor were they directed to do so by agents
of foreign governments. Instead, after finding that they had access to
information that was in great demand abroad, most engaged in illegal
collection to satisfy their desire for profits, for academic or scientific acclaim, or out of a sense of patriotism for their home countries.221
218. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONFOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE-2005 (2006), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA465038.
219. According to the Espionage report, figures are from the federal fiscal year 2005
(Oct. 04 – Sep. 05). Id.
220. Just as they have since the Counterintelligence Community first began systematic
tracking of foreign collection efforts in 1997. Id.
221. “Private-sector players — foreign businessmen, scientists, engineers, students, and
academics — were active collectors in FY2005, although those who engaged in theft represented only a small fraction of total foreign experts in the United States.” Id.

GRESS ON

\\server05\productn\S\SFT\26-4\SFT405.txt

586

unknown

Seq: 40

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

20-APR-10

7:20

[Vol. XXVI

According to the Espionage report, the “spy” could be just about anyone, including a United States citizen.222 As for the impact on individuals with improper motives, the recommendation is more likely to
encourage attempts to evade the requirements, instead of resulting in
their detection. Additional subjective criteria will enhance the incentives for subversives to create false documentation. Moreover, as the Espionage Report observed, it would not address the issue of corporate
espionage cases involving United States citizens or legal permanent
residents.
B. CONTROLLING THE DEEMED EXPORT OF ONLY THE MOST CRITICAL
TECHNOLOGIES WILL FACILITATE THE SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION NECESSARY TO
ADVANCE U.S. SECURITY
Among its recommendations, the Advisory Committee urged that BIS
narrow the scope of technologies on the Commerce Control List and involve an outside panel of experts to conduct an annual “zero-based” review of which technologies should be on the list, with an eye toward
determining which technologies should be subject to deemed export licensing requirements.223 In its report, the Advisory Committee recommended narrowing the scope of technologies on the CCL because it
believed that BIS should concentrate on those technologies having the
greatest national security concerns and should eliminate from the CCL
those technologies having little national security concerns. By building
higher walls around fewer technologies, the Advisory Committee believed that BIS could more effectively protect United States national security interests while maintaining United States innovation.
BIS announced the formation of the Emerging Technologies and Research Advisory Committee (“ETRAC”), on May 23, 2008, because of public comments submitted to it in 2007 regarding the CCL, the Advisory
Committee’s Final Report, and a Presidential directive224 calling for BIS
to regularly reassess and update the CCL.225 ETRAC is a technical advisory committee established under the terms of the Export Administration Act, International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act,
222. Id.
223. ERA OF GOBALIZATION, supra note 7 at 21-2.
224. See Nat’l Sec. Presidential Directive 56 (Jan. 22, 2008), available at http://www.
bis.doc.gov/pdf/nspd_fact_sheet_1-16-2008.pdf. A Dual-Use Trade Reform directive on January 22, 2008 called for the constant reassessment of export controls to ensure that they
control the export and re-export of sensitive items while minimizing their impact on United
States economic competitiveness and innovation. Id.
225. See press release, Bureau of Indus. & Sec., U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, BIS Establishes Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Committee (May 23, 2008), available
at http://www.bis.doc.gov/news/2008/etrac_release05232008.htm.
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and Federal Advisory Committee Act, and comprises representatives
from research universities, government research labs, and industry.226
The ETRAC makes recommendations to BIS regarding emerging technologies on a regular basis as well as advises BIS on the conduct of a
“zero-based” technology review envisioned by the Advisory Committee.227 While BIS is already conducting a systematic review of the CCL
to assess what controls it should retain or revise, many technologies on
the CCL are subject to multilateral controls and consequently the United
States cannot unilaterally change them. Deemed export licensing requirements, however, are not multilateral and thus the United States
may change the requirements without agreement by other countries.
Therefore, BIS is focusing this recommendation for a zero-based review
only on those technologies that should be subject to deemed export-licensing requirements.
Given the widespread use of technically trained non-U.S. researchers in product development activities in the U.S., imposition of a deemed
export requirement has a disproportionate impact on the use of technical
talent and the organization of R&D in large segments of U.S. industry
and across university campuses. Many companies and universities argue that only technology areas specifically controlled by one of the multilateral proliferation regimes (the Australia Group, the Missile
Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group), are focused enough and are of a high enough risk to have specific deemed export requirements.228 Items controlled by the proliferation regimes
represent a relatively small subset of those currently caught by deemed
226. See Id. Members were appointed to the ETRAC on Tuesday, September 23, 2008
and include: Pamela Abshire, University of Maryland; Maja Mataric, University of Southern California; Jeffrey Ashe, General Electric Global Research; Richard McCullough, Carnegie Mellon University; Robert Breault, Breault Research Organization, Inc.; Steven
Patterson, Lawrence Livermore National Lab.; Claude Canizares, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology; Carl A. Picconatto, MITRE Experimental Laboratory; A. Stephen Dahms,
Alfred E. Mann Foundation; Jeffrey Puschell, Raytheon Space & Airborne Systems;
Charbel Farhat, Stanford University; Jeffrey Reed, Virginia Tech; Bob Gleichauf, Cisco
Systems; Michael Reiter, University of North Carolina; Harry Kington, Honeywell Aerospace; Samuel Stanley, Jr, Washington University; Gerald Kulcinski, University of Wisconsin; Marlin Thomas, Air Force Institute of Technology; Brooks Keel, Louisiana State
University; Thomas E. Tierney IV, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Nikolai Leung,
Qualcomm, Inc.; James Tour, Rice University; Seth R. Marder, Georgia Institute of Technology. Id.
227. See Notice of Inquiry, 73 Fed. Reg. 28795 (Dep’t of Commerce May 19, 2008), available at wais.access.gpo.gov (explaining that a zero-based review means determining what
should be controlled without reference to what is currently controlled, rather than reviewing current controls and identifying what should be decontrolled).
228. See, e.g., DeCrappeo, supra note 137; Palma, supra note 201; Letter from Jeff Rittener, Global Export Compliance Manager, Intel Corp. to Bureau of Indus. and Sci., U.S.
Dep’t of Commerce (Aug. 18, 2008) (on file with author).
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export controls, and as a general matter, are not widely disseminated
within civilian enterprises. As a result, only companies that specialize in
these critical products and technologies will contain such items.
In addition, there is a clear multilateral consensus both on the need
to control these technologies, and on which countries are the targets of
these controls. A similar agreement does not exist for other dual-use
items controlled by the Wassenaar Arrangement.229 In order to level the
playing field for United States companies and universities using these
items, the government should make an effort to “multi-lateralize” the
concept of deemed export for this subset of technologies. Availability in
fact of the technology outside the U.S. should be a major, if not the sole,
determining factor as to whether an item remains on the control list.
C. “SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED” CLAUSES IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS IMPROPERLY RESTRICT PUBLICATION AND THE
INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS IN
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CONTRARY TO THE
STATED POLICY OF NSDD-189
A survey of twenty institutions conducted in 2003-2004 under the
auspices of the Association of American Universities and the Council on
Governmental Relations found 138 attempts by the government to restrict the publication of data or foreign-national participation in research.230 Anecdotal information presented at the regional meetings
229. See Wassenaar Arrangement, supra, note 14. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, is one of four
multilateral export control regimes in which the United States participates. The Arrangement’s purpose is to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dualuse (i.e. those having civil and military uses) goods and technologies to prevent destabilizing accumulations of those items.
The Wassenaar Arrangement establishes lists of items for which member countries are to
apply export controls. Member governments implement these controls to ensure that
transfers of the controlled items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of
military capabilities that undermine the goals of the Arrangement, and do not divert to
support such capabilities. In addition, the Wassenaar Arrangement imposes some reporting requirements on its member governments. The U.S. Government controls all items for
export that the Wassenaar Arrangement controls multilaterally. In general, the U.S. Department of Commerce administers export controls for dual-use goods and technologies
controlled in the Wassenaar Arrangement and controlled for national security reasons on
the Commerce Control List and the U.S. Department of State administers export controls
on conventional arms. Id.
230. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10. The National Academy of Sciences is
a private, nonprofit, self-perpetuating society of distinguished scholars engaged in scientific and engineering research, dedicated to the furtherance of science and technology and
to their use for the general welfare. Upon the authority of the charter granted to it by the
Congress in 1863, the Academy has a mandate that requires it to advise the federal govern-
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indicates that inappropriate restrictions are continuing to be included in
research awards; however, it is unknown whether the number and frequency of such restrictions are changing.231 The University of California
– Berkeley reports that U.C. campuses “have turned down millions of
dollars in government contracts,” because of restrictions on
publication.232
Although there have been instances of the inclusion of publication
and access restrictions in assistance awards (grants and cooperative
agreements), the far greater problem for universities has been in the procurement (contracts) area. Contracting officers and universities sometimes do not recognize that the fundamental principles as well as much
of the wording of NSDD-189 are incorporated into the Federal Acquisition Regulations.233 The problem for universities is that federal agencies sometimes impose restrictions on publications or foreign nationals in
their research contracts to universities when the research complies with
the requirements of NSDD-189. More difficult for universities is the fact
that federal agencies award research contracts to industrial firms without the fundamental research exclusion (which is appropriate), but do
not consider that the sub-recipient who will help perform the work may
ment on scientific and technical matters. The House Committee on Science and Technology asked the National Academies to organize regional meetings on university campuses to
gain a better understanding of whether concerns about our country’s need to protect itself
from terrorist threats had resulted in policy changes that were altering our ability to attract the best and brightest scientists and engineers and to undertake and conduct leadingedge research. Id.
231. Id. (recommending that by implementing new security measures the United States
must be cognizant that, in a context of increasing globalization and competition, policies
that consider only a desire for protection through additional restrictions and controls could
have adverse effects on economic growth, international competitiveness, and even longterm aspects of national security if they are not properly balanced with the need for open
communication and collaboration on the part of scientists and engineers. In addition, although beyond its charge, the committee recognized that the unknowable nature of when,
where, and what the next threat will be requires that the United States continue to rely on
a broad-based talent pool as well as fundamental, long-term research programs. Important
advances from long-term research are critical to meeting the challenge of future technological threats and human health concerns, and thus such research must receive substantial
federal support.).
232. Barry Bergman, Research under fire: In the War on Terror, Academic Freedom
Could Wind Up as Collateral Damage, BERKELEYAN, January 15, 2005, available at http://
berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2005/01/27_acfreedom.shtml.
233. See F.A.R. 27.404(g)(2). The Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) governs all
Federal Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated
funds. The FAR precludes agency acquisition regulations that unnecessarily repeat, paraphrase, or otherwise restate the FAR, limits agency acquisition regulations to those necessary to implement FAR policies and procedures within an agency, and provides for
coordination, simplicity, and uniformity in the federal acquisition process. It also provides
for agency and public participation in developing the FAR and agency acquisition regulation. Id.
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be a university for which the restrictions are not appropriate. The industrial prime may be reluctant, or unable, to secure sponsor approval to
remove the requirement from their subcontracts to universities.
In the months following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration reaffirmed the intent of NSDD-189. Then Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, confirmed
that “the policy on the transfer of scientific, technical, and engineering
information set forth in NSDD-189 shall remain in effect, and we will
ensure that this policy is followed.”234 Nonetheless, concerned about an
erosion of the protections to fundamental research offered by NSDD-189,
in 2002 the presidents of the National Academies issued a statement
calling upon the government to affirm and maintain the general principle of NSDD-189:
A successful balance between these two needs—security and openness—demands clarity in the distinctions between classified and unclassified research. We believe it to be essential that these distinctions
not include poorly defined categories of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ information that do not provide precise guidance on what information should
be restricted from public access. Experience shows that vague criteria
of this kind generate deep uncertainties among both scientists and officials responsible for enforcing regulations. The inevitable effect is to
stifle scientific creativity and to weaken national security.235

A report entitled, Security Controls on Scientific Information and the
Conduct of Scientific Research, by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that the creeping nature of these controls creates
ambiguity, results in discrimination, and generates delays and inflexibility that can hinder discoveries and scare away talent.236 The report
noted that the security benefits of such policies are modest when
weighed against the risks of such policies to United States technological
leadership.237

234. Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Nat’l Sec. Advisor, to Harold Brown, Co-Chairman, Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Studies (Nov. 1, 2001), available at www.fas.org/sgp/bush/
cr110101.html.
235. Bruce Alberts, Harvey Fineberg, & William A. Wulf, Presidents of the Nat’l Academies, Statements on Science and Security in an Age of Terrorism (October 18, 2002), available at www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=s10182002b.
236. See Homeland Sec. Program, Ctr. for Strategic and Int’l Studies, Security Controls
on Scientific Information and the Conduct of Scientific Research (2005), available at http://
www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0506_cscans.pdf (asserting that an open scientific environment provides for the greatest security of the United States).
237. Id.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress, the President, and the Office of Science and Technology
Policy all agree that academic research plays a vital role in the American
economy, in light of the current globalized world:
America’s economic strength and global leadership depend in large
measure on our Nation’s ability to generate and harness the latest in
scientific and technological developments and to apply these developments to real world applications. These applications are fueled by: scientific research, which produces new ideas and new tools that can
become the foundation for tomorrow’s products, services, and ways of
doing business; a strong education system that equips our workforce
with the skills necessary to transform those ideas into goods and services that improve our lives and provide our Nation with the researchers of the future; and an environment that encourages
entrepreneurship, risk taking, and innovative thinking.238

In concert with this rationale, Congress passed and the President
signed the “America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote
Excellence in Technology, Education, and Sciences” (“COMPETES”) Act,
a bill to strengthen the United States educational system in science and
technology in order for the nation to remain competitive in today’s global
knowledge economy.239 However, before such initiatives start to produce
home-grown talent capable of filling the heightened demand for highlyqualified researchers, practicing American-born scientists and engineers
continue to be in short supply and thus, the country remains heavily reliant upon foreign talent. A statement in the National Academy of Sciences’ 2005 report, Policy Implication of International Graduate
Students and Postdoctoral Scholars in the United States, puts this reliance in the following perspective:
238. AM. COMPETITIVE INITIATIVE, DOMESTIC POL’Y COUNCIL, OFFICE OF SCI. & TECHNOLPOL’Y, THE WHITE HOUSE 1 (2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/aci/. The President’s American Competitiveness Initiative launched in
early 2006, which the Office of Science and Technology Policy describes in the following
terms: “Keeping our competitive edge in the world economy requires focused policies that
lay the groundwork for continued leadership in innovation, exploration, and ingenuity.” Id.
239. See press release, Office of the Press Sec’y, The White House, Fact Sheet: America
Competes Act of 2007 – President Bush Signs Legislation Sharing Goals Of His American
Competitiveness Initiative (Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/08/20070809-6.html.The “America COMPETES Act” is a bipartisan legislative
response to recommendations contained in the National Academies report “Rising Above
the Gathering Storm” and the Council on Competitiveness report “Innovate America.” The
America COMPETES Act focuses on three primary areas of importance to maintaining and
improving United States’ innovation in the 21st Century: (1) increasing research investment, (2) strengthening educational opportunities in science, technology, engineering, and
mathematics from elementary through graduate school, and (3) developing an innovation
infrastructure. Id.

OGY
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As the [science & engineering] expertise rises around the world, it is in
the nation’s interest to understand better the contributions of international scientists and engineers to the United States economy and national security, create policies that can sustain this contribution, and
find ways to attract more United States citizens to careers in [science &
engineering].The American Competitiveness Initiative, the COMPETES ACT, and other such programs will surely help alleviate the
United States shortfall in the future years, but in the interim [d]eemed
[e]xports remain a national concern.240

Significant innovation is occurring in other parts of the world where
multinational collaboration is thriving and there are fewer constraints
imposed by export restrictions. Many of these foreign activities draw
upon individuals educated in the United States. For instance, at
Microsoft’s Beijing research laboratory, one-third of its programmers
have a Ph.D. from United States universities.241 In fact, a 2006 study
conducted by researchers at the Pratt School of Engineering at Duke
University concluded that persons from outside the United States
founded 52% of Silicon Valley companies and 39% of California start-ups
in the 1995-2005 period, with Indian being the predominant ethnic group
leading these startups in the second five years of the study.242 Some of
these companies started with venture funding and now employ tens of
thousands of United States workers.243
Any impact on restricting foreign nationals’ ability to engage in unclassified fundamental research could have a devastating impact on the
U.S. competitiveness, national security, economic growth and the U.S.’s
preeminence in science and engineering research. BIS should supplant
its national affiliation determination with the preexisting Visa Mantis
review. The Visa Mantis security review is a comprehensive system involving the participation of multiple U.S. government agencies to identify students and scholars that may be affiliated or associated with
240. See NAT’L ACADEMIES, POL’Y IMPLICATIONS OF INT’L GRADUATE STUDENTS AND POSTSCHOLARS IN THE U.S. (2005), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?
isbn=0309096138&page=R1 (reshaping federal policies that govern the movement and activities of international scientists and engineers, particularly with respect to visa and immigration policy is critical).The National Academies is the same institution responsible for
drafting the Corson Report in 1982. Id.
241. See AUSTIN WANDA, MALINA HILLS & ELAINE LIM, THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION,
OUTSOURCING OF R&D: HOW WORRIED SHOULD WE BE? (2007), available at http://
www7.nationalacademies.org/guirr/Wanda.Austin.pdf.
242. Mark Lavender, Skilled, Educated Immigrants Contribute Significantly to United
States Economy, DUKE U. NEWS & COMM., January 3, 2007, available at http://www.duke
news.duke.edu/2007/01/engineerstudy.html.
243. See ANDERSON STUART AND MICHAELA PLATZER, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN MADE: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURS AND PROFESSIONALS
ON UNITED STATES COMPETITIVENESS 14 (2006), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/AmericanMade_study.pdf.

DOCTORAL
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terrorist groups that could threaten the U.S.’s security or that pose a
threat to the U.S.’s national security by illegally transferring sensitive
technology. Any additional criteria for reviewing access to CCL technologies by a foreign national should only rely on credible and specific information that a particular individual will export controlled technology for
the purpose of doing harm to the U.S. Assessing “loyalty” is too vague
and subjective a term to be meaningful. Moreover, tracing an individual’s place of residence, from birthplace to current country of citizenship
is a difficult task that would require resources beyond any universities’
capabilities. Engaging in such detailed background research of foreignborn students would violate not only the principle of nondiscrimination
and privacy laws, but also the spirit of openness and inclusiveness that
have been the hallmark and strength of the American research university for decades. The best protection of national security will allow universities to retain this spirit, which has brought foreign-born luminaries
like Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi, Hans Bethe, Niels Bohr, and Werner
von Braun. The visa screening process should be the primary method of
providing information to the federal government on national security
threats posed by individuals seeking to enter the U.S.
Additionally, incorporating exceptions for “intra-company” licenses
or transfers into the deemed export rule to permit U.S. companies to provide all of its employees access to controlled technology within their operating units and manufacturing facilities would provide a more costTABLE 1. Examples of Immigrant-Founded Venture-Backed Public Companies

Company

Immigrant
Founder or
Co-founder

Country of
Birth

Number of
Employees
(FY2005)

Industry

Intel Corp.

Andy Grove

Hungary

99,900

Semiconductor &
related
manufacturing

Solectron Corp.

Winston Chen

Taiwan

53,000

Bare printed
circuit board
manufacturing

Sanmina-SCI
Corp

Jure Sola

Bosnia

48,621

Bare printed
circuit board
manufacturing

Sun
Microsystems

Andreas
Bechtolsheim

Germany

31,000

Electronic
computer
manufacturing

eBay Inc.

Pierre Omidyar

France

12,600

Electronics
auctions

Yahoo, Inc.

Jerry Yang

Taiwan

9,800

Web search
portals

Google, Inc.

Sergey Brin

Russia

5,680

Web search
portals
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effective solution than the Advisory Committee’s proposal. The companies themselves are well suited and have considerable commercial incentives to minimize the risk that foreign nationals will receive their
sensitive technology subject to the companies’ internal controls. Such a
system would benefit the exporting community by eliminating the need
for qualifying companies to seek individual licenses. This mechanism
would also benefit BIS by allowing resources currently dedicated to reviewing deemed export license applications to be rededicated to other
valuable purposes. It would also likely be more effective in managing
the potential threat to U.S. national security and far more efficient than
the Advisory Committee’s approach of basing licensing determinations
on the country of birth, prior countries of residence, and other comprehensive sets of criteria. Furthermore, technology kept within the confines of a company should not require individual licenses, particularly to
share with employees inside the U.S. Empowering companies to rely on
their internal control programs, including the use of intellectual property
protection and non-disclosure agreements, will increase efficiency and
benefit national security by ensuring that resources are devoted to the
highest and best use by industry and government.
As a general matter, U.S. deemed export controls are a unilateral
U.S. control, and in its present form, is relatively recent. Prior to 1995,
controls on release of technology to non-U.S. nationals in the U.S. were
based on the principle that an unauthorized export was not presumed or
“deemed” unless there were specific facts that would indicate to a U.S.
entity that such a violation were probable. This continues to be a sound
basis for controls on technology to non-U.S. nationals, and is conceptually consistent with the Advisory Committee’s recommendations. Furthermore, it is clear that narrowing the range of technologies listed on
the CCL as subject to export controls, including deemed export controls,
is essential for the list to be effective.
In its current form, the CCL is far too broad and outdated to be a
useful tool for protecting vital U.S. national interests. Narrowing the list
drastically is vital to strategic effectiveness, credibility, and compliance
clarity. For example, despite the common notion that “nanotechnology”
means “cutting edge,” it is a term covering a huge array of techniques
now used in products including textiles, cosmetics, and shampoos, areas
that clearly should not be restricted.244 Another illustration is that
many computer encryption technologies that emerged a few years ago
and that contain rarified knowledge re now internationally publicly
available and existing export control numbers may not adequately define
the latest encryption technologies today.
244. See Jamie Joiner, Dual-Use Export Controls on Nanotechnology, 5 NAL. & BUS. 1 (2008).

NOTECHNOLOGY
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The formation of ETRAC was an undoubtedly positive step for BIS,
but the criteria used for its review of export controls must be determined.
In order to prevent the chilling effect that the deemed export rule imparts on research and development of new technologies, BIS should narrow its list of controlled technologies to items 1) not readily available to
the international science and technology community beyond the scope of
U.S. controls; and 2) that should be intensively protected from dissemination because of substantive and significant application to national security. Only information about specific technologies that pose a clear
threat to national security interests and that cannot be controlled more
appropriately by classification should be controlled as deemed exports. If
information about a particular technology is reasonably available and
can be readily gleaned from elsewhere in the world, deemed export controls should not apply. BIS should narrow the scope of controlled technologies to the most critical covered by the CCL; namely, those
appearing on the Wassenaar “very sensitive” list and other similarly narrow subsets of the items controlled for nuclear, missile, chemical/biological, and other reasons. The approach should be to “multi-lateralize” such
items so that U.S. companies and universities will not be placed at an
unfair disadvantage when competing globally with institutions not subject to such controls. Moreover, dual-use items and information controlled for purposes of deemed exports should be consistent with
regulations issued by other federal agencies pertaining to the protection
of national and homeland security, i.e., the control of biological agents by
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the National Institutes of Health. Recognized exclusions
for such items should harmonize with the CCL.
Lastly, government contracts with universities that contain limitations on publication rights and the inclusion of foreign nationals in research erode the principal exclusions found in NSDD-189. To illustrate
the problem, a situation exploring the dilemma faced by the scientific
and security communities regarding openness in research is helpful.
First, the publication of research on pathogens could provide terrorists
with recipes for their production, enabling an attack that could endanger
the U.S. population. Consequently, one reaction might be to restrict
such publications. Yet a considerable amount of this research is performed outside the United States and is already available to those who
might misuse the information. Given such a situation, it is possible that
an attack enabled by advanced research could occur in the coming years
even if the United States were to impose restrictions on the publication
of such information. Moreover, a failure to publish information might
inhibit the development of the capability to treat those affected and prevent the spread of any resulting diseases. Open and rapid publication,
rather than restrictions on publication, facilitates the rapid development
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of understanding on the part of researchers studying the pathogens. In
addition to recognizing that NSDD-189 is incorporated into the Federal
Acquisition Regulation, it is important that federal regulations such as
the EAR and ITAR be made consistent with NSDD-189.245
VII. CONCLUSION
U.S. industry and academia rely on their ability to attract, hire, contract, and collaborate with foreign nationals as well as U.S. persons in
order to improve existing and create new technologies and products and
thus to compete effectively in today’s global environment. Companies
and universities face a serious shortfall of qualified experts in technology
industries, and it is becoming increasingly more difficult to attract and
hire not only qualified U.S. persons, but also foreign nationals. Unilateral U.S. government policies such as deemed export controls place U.S.
companies and universities at a disadvantage when competing globally
for the best-qualified workforce. While the U.S. is a favored destination
for individuals seeking academic and professional career opportunities,
other countries are increasing their success in attracting the same talent
pool. In this competitive environment, U.S. government policies placing
barriers on the hiring, deployment, and utilization of foreign nationals
should be narrowly crafted to clearly and effectively address specific policy objectives without excessively and inappropriately burdening
industry.
245. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10.

